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Abstract
Over thirty-four years since the 1960-1975 Second Indochina War,
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) continues to inhibit a multitude of
development priorities in Laos. One of only three remaining Least
Developed Countries in Southeast Asia, greater understanding of the
socio-economic effects of UXO is crucial to the development of Laos.
Drawing on three weeks of field work in June 2009, primarily composed
of semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation and literature
analysis, this thesis examines the effects of UXO alongside an analysis of
how existing responses to UXO contamination in Laos may be improved.
Furthermore, it is argued in this thesis that discrepancies over the
perceived seriousness of UXO contamination exist between humanitarian
operators and those who live in contaminated districts. In examining the
effects of UXO contamination on the consolidation of post-conflict
development, the analysis offered highlights the need for greater
understanding of this legacy of war within post-conflict and human
development theories.
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Chapter One
- The Land of a Thousand Irrelevances1 When the buffalo fight the grass is flattened
– Lao Proverb (Murphy 1999: 209)

Figure 1.1: Map of Laos’ Administrative Divisions
(Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research ((NCCR)) 2008)
1

Laos has historically been known in colloquial terms as the land of a thousand elephants. The

title given is a variation on this name to indicate the isolation that Laos has experienced in the
past century of expanding global trade and industrialisation.
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1.1 Introduction
For the past decade development in Southeast Asia has predominantly
been a story of economic growth and accompanying social progress. In a
region

of

highly

disproportionate

development,

however,

the

development of Laos2 has shown little improvement. Life expectancy
remains low at just 56.29 years3 (CIA 2008) and in 2009 the country
continues to be listed by the United Nations as one of only three4 Least
Developed Countries5 (LDC’s) within Southeast Asia. A small,
mountainous, landlocked country, the total land area of Laos is just
236,800 square kilometres (CIA 2008), or approximately one third of the
size of New South Wales. A common characteristic of many LDC’s
(Collier 2007), Laos’ landlocked surroundings and its mountainous
landscape have restricted access to trade and inhibited the countries

2

The conventional short forms for the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic are either ‘Lao PDR’ or

simply ‘Laos’. Although either term is accepted, in accordance with the majority of academic
publications on the country this thesis will only use the term Laos.
3

As Laos has no life registry all population and mortality data are only estimates based on
surveys and census (UNDP 2006).
4
5

The other two states are Cambodia and Myanmar.

The term Least Developed Country, or LDC, refers to a collection of developing countries that
are characterised by their exceptionally low levels of economic and social development.
Generally speaking, LDC’s have low per capita incomes, poor physical infrastructure, high
vulnerability to natural disasters, low life expectancy, and low levels of school enrolment (Ghai
2006).
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socio-economic development since the sixteenth century6 (Pholsena
2006). Sharing borders with Cambodia, China, Myanmar, Thailand, and
Vietnam and with an estimated total population of just 6,677,534 (CIA
2008), Laos has the lowest population density in Southeast Asia
(Pholsena 2006). Topographically, Laos contains sixteen provinces and
one municipality and has been further demarcated into one hundred and
thirty-nine districts (NCCR 2008). Of these districts, twenty-five have
been identified as ‘poor’ and twenty-two as ‘very poor7’ (See Figure 1.2).
In total, these forty-seven poorest districts account for approximately 1.2
million people, or over one sixth of the Lao population (NSEDP 2006).

1.2 Laos Development Constraints
As an LDC Laos’ government and the international community is faced
with numerous development concerns. The majority of rural households
in Laos lack access to short-term credit facilities and according to
Pholsena (2006) as many as eighty percent of public banks are nonperforming. Exports are concentrated on few products and domestic
resources are insufficient for implementing the governments National

6

In the sixteenth century Laos did not exist in its current form but the Kingdom of Lang Xang,
which may be considered as the Laos of the time, was weakened by its inability to engage with
expanding maritime trade (Pholsena 2006b).
7

Very poor villages are those with an incidence of poverty exceeding seventy percent while the

total average incidence of poverty in the seventy-two poor and very poor districts is fifty-five
percent (NCCR 2008).
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Socio-Economic Development Plan (UNDP 2008). As is common to
both post-conflict countries and LDC’s the modern Lao government has
always been economically weak and dependent on outsider support (Del
Castillo 2008; Collier 2007). In fact according to Pholsena (2006b: 65),
Laos is the highest recipient country of development or ‘aid’ funding in
all of Southeast Asia and since 1990 financial aid from bilateral donors
and multilateral funding organisations has amounted to more than two
hundred and fifty million USD per year. Such international aid, although
necessary, limits the state’s autonomy and control over its own future
(Thomas-Slayter 2003).
Public infrastructure, food security, communicable diseases, the
assistance of remote rural communities, and sustainable use of the
environment are all ongoing development concerns (Evans 1998). A
large percentage of Laos’ landmass is not easily accessible and according
to Evans (1998) estimated arable land covers just four to five percent of
the country. Road networks are limited and poorly constructed (Warr
2008) and in the capital city of Vientiane there is no sewerage system
(Askew, Logan, & Long 2008). Food security remains a serious concern
and according to the World Food Programme in 2007 as many as fifty
percent of children under the age of five suffered chronic malnutrition.
Malaria and other communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and
cholera continue to afflict the Lao population and its development and in
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2008 forty-eight of every one thousand people were recorded as having
malaria (Serdan 2008). Due to Laos’ problematic geography one of the
biggest challenges to development is accessing remote communities.
Approximately eighty percent of the Lao population live in rural areas
and malnourishment of children is often higher among remote ethnic
groups (WFP 2007). Many people in rural areas still lack access to safe
drinking water and because of Laos’ tropical monsoonal climate natural
disasters such as flooding remain as a persistent livelihood threat (World
Bank 2008; UNDP 2009). While rich in natural resources, care must be
taken to ensure that this economic opportunity does not become a poverty
‘trap’ due to poor management resulting in the ‘Dutch disease8’ (Collier
2007). Finally, as will be discussed extensively throughout this thesis,
unexploded ordnance9 (or UXO as it is commonly known), from the
Second Indochina War remains as a powerful inhibitor to Laos’
development.

8

‘Dutch disease’ is a generally used term to describe the process in which resource exports

cause a countries currency value to rise against the currencies of other countries, making the
resource exporting countries other exporting activities uncompetitive. This can be problematic
for development if the export activities that become uncompetitive are in fact the better
vehicles for technological progress (Collier 2007: 39).
9

Although there is no universally agreed upon definition for unexploded ordnance, (or UXO), it
is generally considered as explosive weapons that did not detonate when they were fired,
dropped, launched or projected, that still pose the risk of exploding. UXO contamination in the
Lao PDR consists primarily of large bombs, rockets, grenades, artillery munitions, mortars,
landmines, and cluster munitions as well as cluster sub-munitions (UNDP 2008).
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Figure 1.2: Map of Laos’ forty-seven poorest districts
(Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research ((NCCR)) 2008)
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1.3 The Second Indochina War

Our lives became like those of animals desperately trying to
escape their hunters… human beings, whose parents brought
them into the world and carefully raised them with overflowing
love despite so many difficulties, these human beings would die
from a single blast…

-Recollection of the War by a Lao Refugee (Branfman 1972: 35).

As with all post-conflict countries, for contemporary development
practice to be successful in Laos an understanding of its history of
conflict is essential. Although it may be impossible to pinpoint an exact
starting date, according to Warner (1996) the Second Indochina war
began in Laos sometime in the year 1960. From this year until the
Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation agreement of February 1973,
ground battles were fought between, on the one side, the Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party and the North Vietnamese, and on the other, The
Royal Lao Army, General Vang Pao’s resistance forces10, and CIA
supported Thai PARU11 units (Warner 1996). These battles tended to
10

Vang Pao was a Hmong General who led a resistance army against Pathet Lao forces. His forces
consisted primarily of Hmong soldiers but also included other Lao ethnicities. General Vang
Pao’s forces were supported financially and militarily by the U.S. (Warner 1996).
11

The Thai Police Aerial Resupply Unit (PARU) were a CIA trained elite police unit. Originally
trained to fight the opium trade in Northern Thailand they were used in Laos during the war not
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follow a pattern of communist advances in the dry season and royalist
retaliations in the wet season. The majority of ground battles fought in
Laos were at the strategically important Plain of Jars in the Northeast and
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail12 in the South (Warner 1996). Essentially,
the war was between the existing Royal Lao government and the Lao
People’s Revolutionary Party, or the ‘Pathet Lao13’. However, the war in
Laos was also a satellite war of the larger Cold War and American and
Soviet involvement were substantial. In 1971, for example, annual U.S.
spending reached an estimated one and a half billion USD (Warner 1996:
321). Indeed, as with South Vietnam, the eventual departure of the U.S.
from Indochina would be too much for the Royal Lao Government and in
1975, at the same time that Pol Pot’s brutal regime was just beginning in
Cambodia (Winter 2007), Laos became the Pathet Lao controlled Lao
Peoples Democratic Republic (Warner 1996).

only because they were familiar with the climate, culture, and guerrilla warfare, but also
because they were difficult to tell apart from Laotian soldiers. For a detailed description of the
war in Laos and the parties involved see Warner, R 1996, Shooting at the Moon; The story of
America’s clandestine war in Laos, Steerforth Press, USA.
12

A system of roads and footpaths, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a major artery over which the
North Vietnamese transported troops and supplies to South Vietnam (Kingshill 1991: 140).
13

The Pathet Lao is the commonly used term for the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and is the
terminology used in most written work on the Laos.
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1.4 The United States Bombing Campaign
As part of their support to the Royal Lao government and to serve their
own interests fighting against the North Vietnamese and the spread of
communism, the United States conducted an extensive bombing
campaign over Laos during the Second Indochina War (Warner 1996).
Under the guise of ‘armed reconnaissance missions’ the US flew 580,944
bombing missions over Laos and dropped over 2,000,000 tonnes of
munitions. Equivalent to one planeload of bombs every eight minutes for
nine years and at a cost of 2,190,000 USD per day (HDR 2001), this
statistic makes Laos the most heavily bombed country in history
(Kingshill 1991; Cave, Lawson & Sherriff 2006). According to a 2008
report by Landmine Monitor, four million large bombs, defoliants,
herbicides and more than two hundred and seventy million submunitions14 were all dropped over Laos. The most prolific form of UXO
remaining in Laos today, air delivered sub-munitions dropped on Laos
include BLU-3, 7, 18, 24/66, 26/36/59, 42/54, 43, 44, 45, 61, 63, 66, 73,
and Mk 118 (HIB 2006).
Not all bombing in Laos was directed at military targets and according to
Warner, to erode moral support and remove potential recruits for the
Pathet Lao, civilian villages were also often targeted. Furthermore,

14

The UXO Trust Fund and the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Program’s latest study of the
bombing data estimates the number of cluster sub-munitions dropped was 288,485,886 (Shane
2006).
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according to Kingshill (1991) planes returning to Thailand from
terminated missions in Vietnam would also use Laos as a ‘free drop’
zone to discard unused munitions. While there is no accepted figure for
the direct casualties of US bombing the intensity of the attacks coupled
with eyewitness accounts suggest civilian casualty levels were
appallingly high (Cave et al. 2006). Of the civilians that were not killed
by the bombings many became refugees and from 1962 to 1971 there
were more than six hundred thousand Laotian refugees from a population
that, at the time, was just three million (Paul 1971; Warner 1996).
Conditions suffered by these relocated people were often atrocious and
reports detailing their suffering are numerous15 (Branfman 1972; Murphy
1999; Warner, 1996). Likewise, the living conditions of those who
remained in their home villages were often deplorable as frequent
bombardments forced many residents to move into makeshift
underground shelters or to flee into the jungle to live as “almost huntergatherers” (Zasloff 1969: 69; Evans 2002: 149).

15

For the most comprehensive account of the living conditions of internally displaced people
during the war see Branfman, F. 1972, Voices from the Plain of Jars; Life under an Air War,
Harper & Row, New York.
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1.5 Post-Conflict Laos
When the Pathet Lao obtained control of Laos in 1975 they inherited a
state that was ravaged by the effects of warfare. No longer sustained by
the millions of dollars of U.S. economic assistance that was given to the
Royal Lao Government during the war, in 1975 Laos was one of the ten
poorest countries in the world (Warner 1996). Adding to the poor socioeconomic status of the country at the time, when the Pathet Lao took
control of Laos they began to send many of the country’s former elite to
re-education camps and as a result the majority of the educated migrated
elsewhere. Although exact figures are unknown, according to Evans
(2002: 180) between 10,000 to 40,000 inmates were held prisoner in
these camps. Now over thirty years later, although the state is politically
stable and unlikely to return to conflict, through the widespread
proliferation of UXO contamination Laos’ development continues to be
inhibited by the legacy of this war.
With an estimated failure rate for munitions of between ten and thirty
percent16 (Cave et al. 2006) the United States bombing of Laos makes the
country both the most bombed and the most UXO contaminated country
in history (Sisawath, Clarke, & Fenech, 2008). Fifteen of Laos’

16

Estimates vary between authors, however, the more commonly accepted figure for Laos is
thirty percent.
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seventeen provinces17 are contaminated by UXO and one quarter of all
villages are severely contaminated (see figure 1.3) (UNDP 2008: 9;
NSEDP 2006). UXO can be found everywhere in Laos, from hillsides to
rice fields, school yards, in rivers, along roads and footpaths and even in
the centre of provincial towns (UNDP 2008). One of the most
widespread, multitudinous, and long-term development problems to
affect Laos, since regulated clearance of UXO began in 1996 over one
hundred and eighty-six different types of UXO have been found
(Landmine Monitor 2008). UXO restricts access to useable land,
increases the cost and time frame of development initiatives, inhibits
access to shops, schools, medical facilities, disrupts potential earnings
from tourism, mining, and hydroelectric projects, and causes significant
human casualties.
While UXO is one of the most significant restraints to human
development in Laos, through a well established scrap metal trade it has
also become an economic resource that local people have transformed
into part of their everyday economies (Moyes 2005). A topical issue
within the UXO sector, the scrap metal trade is responsible for both
increasing casualty rates across Laos and for providing the impoverished
with a valuable cash income. Essentially, through the scrap metal trade
UXO has become both an inhibitor to development and an economic and
17

In fact, Laos comprises sixteen provinces and one municipality.
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a cultural asset of the Laotian population. People use war scrap and UXO
to create everyday items such as pots, buckets, belt-buckles, boats, and
even prostheses, recycling not only war materials but also the sociocultural memory of the war (Winter 2007). As the midway point of the
government of Laos’ (GoL) goal to overcome LDC status by 2020 fast
approaches, more research into the effects of UXO contamination on
development is crucial.

Figure 1.3 Map of UXO Contaminated Areas in Laos
(Courtesy of Pheonix Clearannce Limited)
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1.6 Conclusion
While much has been written on the development of Southeast Asia as a
region (Savage & Tan-Mullins 2005; King 2008; Dixon & DrakakisSmith 1997) relatively little attention has been given to Laos.
Publications specifically concerning Laos are rare in academic literature
and are more often historical accounts than contemporary development
analysis (Stuart-fox 1982; Evans 2002). Furthermore, on the few
occasions where development has been the focus of publications, little
attention has been given to UXO contamination (Pholsena 2006b; Askew
et al. 2007; Rigg 1997). By providing an analysis of the present day
effects of UXO contamination on human development in Laos this thesis
seeks to begin addressing this deficiency within the academic field of
development. In the preceding paragraphs this chapter has provided an
introductory overview of Laos’ contemporary development status and a
brief history of the country’s involvement in the Second Indochina War.
Following this introduction, Chapter Two will present a theoretical
overview of post-conflict theory and how it has conceptualised the legacy
of UXO on post-conflict societies. To facilitate a greater understanding
of the effects of UXO on the consolidation of post-conflict recovery, how
human development theory has responded to the effects of UXO
contamination will also be explored. Chapter Three explains the methods
and methodology of the research and in Chapter Four Laos’ UXO aid
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sector will be critically examined. Using the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) as a guiding framework for critical analysis, Chapter
Four will provide both an overview of the current activities within Laos’
UXO sector and an evaluation of the effectiveness of current responses to
contamination. With a thirty year history as the world’s most heavily
UXO contaminated country (Cave et al. 2006) Laos provides the most
inferentially transferable case study for examining the multitude of
potential consequences that may result from UXO contamination.
Examining these consequences, Chapters Five and Six explore the bodily
and socio-economic effects of UXO in Laos. In particular, Chapter Six
will explore the increasing prevalence of a highly organised scrap metal
trade in Laos and the apparent failures of existent UXO risk education
strategies in addressing the increase in casualty rates resulting from this
informal economy. While this thesis does not attempt to discuss every
activity or organisation involved in Laos’ response to UXO
contamination, in building on the research of others this thesis will
provide some brief policy recommendations for the future direction of
Laos’ UXO sector. Overall, the thesis seeks to provide an assessment of
UXO contamination and its impact, together with the key social,
economic and political features of Laos, in order to achieve ‘an
understanding of the problems caused by contamination- and hence the
needs of affected populations’ (GICHD 2004: 4).
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Chapter Two
- Theorising Unexploded Ordnance: Post-conflict and
Human Development Understandings -

2.1 Introduction
The engagement of human beings in warfare is an activity as old as
civilization itself. War is a destructive force that has always existed in
human society and that is likely to continue for as long as mankind
possesses a desire for power. While it has always been accepted that
conflict is the cause of death and suffering post-conflict theory has
revealed that the destructive effects of war often continue long after the
cessation of conflict. Of the forty-nine current LDC’s twenty-one have
experienced grave episodes of violence and instability in the past three
decades (Ghai 2006). According to Junne and Verkoren (2005: 318), the
prevalence of warfare around the globe has resulted in post-conflict
development ‘become[ing] the norm rather than the exception’. Legacies
of war can have an enormous and enduring impact on society and the
reconstruction and development of post-conflict countries can be a highly
problematic task (Bocco, Harrisson, & Oesch 2009). Yet while postconflict theory has been useful in revealing that development in postconflict societies must differ from normal development strategies in the
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reconstruction and peace-building stages of post-conflict recovery
(Stoddard & Harmer 2005), the understanding it provides of the effects
of war in the consolidation stage of development is insufficient. Postconflict development is not the same as conflict free development and
successful development in post-conflict states requires a unique approach
to development practice. To better understand the effects of conflict once
peace and security has been consolidated a greater relationship between
post-conflict theory and human development is required.

2.2

Unexploded

Ordnance:

A

Global

Development

Constraint
UXO contamination affects states across every continent. A likely byproduct of any modern war, according to Borrie (2003) in 2002 at least
eighty-two countries were contaminated by UXO. Of these countries, at
least fifty-seven have experienced direct UXO casualties (Borrie 2003).
Although the effects of UXO contamination differ between states
depending on the quantities and types of ordnance used during the
conflict and the level of response to the resultant problems (Moyes,
Lloyd, & McGrath, 2002), knowledge of one states contamination is
often still beneficial for understanding what problems UXO may cause
elsewhere. In Kosovo where approximately 3.32% of landmass was once
contaminated (Moyes 2007), studies have shown that UXO restricts land
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access and the building of public and private infrastructure. Aside of the
socio-economic effects, UXO in Kosovo has also produced numerous
casualties and widespread fear amongst the civilian population. In
Afghanistan, UXO contamination is the result of over twenty-five years
of conflict and creates similar socio-economic problems as it does in
Kosovo and, as will later be shown, in Laos. Unlike in Laos, however,
UXO contamination in Kosovo has been present for less than a decade
and has been mitigated by one of the largest and best resourced UXO
response programs in history (Moyes 2007). Similarly, in Afghanistan,
there is considerably more information on the problems of UXO
contamination than in Laos and responses to the problem are well
established and largely nationalised (Borrie 2003). Both Iraq and Kuwait
are contaminated by UXO, although unlike Laos Kuwait did not wait
twenty years for an international response to the comparatively small
30,000 tonnes of munitions that were dropped on it during the Gulf War
(McGrath 2000). More similar perhaps is Lebanon, where an adequate
response is still lacking after twenty-five years of ongoing UXO
contamination and the resulting civilian casualties (Moyes & Nash 2005).
According to Borrie (2003) in the Asia Pacific region UXO contaminated
countries can be classified according to three distinctions; those whose
contamination is a result of World War II; those whose contamination is
a result of the Second Indochina War; and those involved in long-
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standing conflicts such as Nepal and Sri Lanka. Of these three groups,
the most comprehensive data exists for the Southeast Asian countries of
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, for whom the majority of contamination
is a result of the Second Indochina War. That said, data on these
countries is far from sufficient and adequate data and available resources
for the treatment and rehabilitation of UXO casualties are insufficient in
all three countries. In Cambodia, all twenty-four of the country’s
provinces are affected by UXO, while in Vietnam around five percent of
the states landmass is contaminated by approximately 300,000 tonnes of
UXO (Borrie 2003). With so many countries being affected by UXO
ensuring sustainable, local capacities to respond to the ongoing threat of
UXO is essential for post-conflict development (Moyes et al. 2002).

2.3 Post-conflict Theory and Unexploded Ordnance
There are few events more socio-economically destructive to a country
and its people than a conflict within its borders. From Afghanistan, to
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Cambodia, Somalia and Sudan strong causal and
consequential correlations have been shown between poverty and conflict
(Borrie 2003). A well recognised relationship within academic research,
a body of literature has developed around the legacy of conflict and the
restoration of peace, stability, and development in post-conflict societies
(Woodhouse 2006; Del Castillo 2008; Chetail 2009). In post-conflict
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states a ‘different yardstick’ (Del Castillo 2008: 43) is required for
development practice as common assumptions about appropriate
development strategies are often inappropriate. As Del Castillo (2008)
explains, in post-conflict countries societies are often too unstable and
potentially corrupt for strong neo-liberal policies, and generally accepted
principles such as the need for equality in development are often less
important than assisting those most seriously affected by the conflict. The
restoration of peace is of upmost priority and overcoming aid
dependency is an important objective once peace has been consolidated
(Rice 2009; Junne & Verkoren 2005) In post-conflict countries it is
crucial that development operators understand the history of conflict so
they do not mistakenly contribute to instability or corruption and, most
pertinent to this research, the removal of UXO contamination is almost
always a part of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Yet although the
removal of UXO is recognised within post-conflict theory as a prerequisite to development, throughout the world there is little data
regarding the quantity of UXO contamination in post-conflict societies
(Del Castillo 2008). Furthermore, even when such data is present it does
not adequately reflect the socio-economic impact of this dangerous
development inhibitor (Moyes et al. 2002).
As with all forms of post-conflict recovery, responses to UXO
contamination always involve various civil society organisations. From
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international organisations such as the United Nations, to governmental
responses, non-governmental organisations, local organisations and
community groups, post-conflict civil society has received much
attention within academic literature (Herrero 2005; Chetail 2009; Barsky
2009). One of the key themes within post-conflict theory’s analysis of
civil society has been the effectiveness of operators in providing postconflict aid. Analysis on this topic has been progressively expanding and
increasing in complexity. Theorists such as Duffield (2007) have argued
that post-conflict aid is actually a form of neo-colonialism aimed at
transforming whole society’s attitudes and beliefs. Similarly, theorists
such as Winter (2007) have argued that previous post-conflict analysis of
civil society has been largely inconsiderate of the role of culture in postconflict aid, while Pouligny (2005) asserts that post-conflict peacebuilding needs to greater acknowledge local civil society organisations
before bringing in external support.
Yet while the analysis of post-conflict aid and the role of civil society is
indeed expanding within academic literature, insufficient attention has
been given to the role of UXO organisations in post-conflict recovery. In
2001 the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were completed
and endorsed by the United Nations as a best practice model for the
implementation of Mine/UXO action programs, and likewise now
provide a framework for academic analysis of the success and failures of
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Mine/UXO programs (IMAS 2009). However, although there are
organisations and private companies with a dedicated focus on
responding to UXO contamination and an international framework for
assessing the achievements and failures of these organisations, little
academic evaluation has been conducted on either UXO civil societies or
the appropriateness of the IMAS. Furthermore, responses to UXO often
also necessitate involvement from organisations that are largely
unfamiliar with the effects that UXO has on development and how they
have responded to UXO contamination also require more research. For
the relationship between UXO contamination, development and
development organisations to be better understood guidance can be
sought within the field of human development theory.

2.4

Human

Development

Theory

and

Unexploded

Ordnance
Beginning with the rather simplistic theoretical understanding of
development as a progression through universal stages of growth
(Parsons 1964) the field of development theory has evolved and
expanded in recent decades to include a multitude of theoretical
perspectives. Perhaps the most comprehensive and widely accepted of
these various development paradigms is human development theory.
Human development theory has gained traction within both academic and
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policy environments and is the principle framework used by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) to measure development. Each
year the UNDP publishes numerous international, regional, and national
Human Development Reports (HDR’s) and since 1990, over six hundred
HDR’s on more than one hundred and forty countries have been
published.
Emerging as a response to the failings of the neo-liberal development
ideology of the 1980’s, human development theory perceives economic
growth as only one part of the development process (Fukuda-Parr 2009).
A theory that examines a multitude of development priorities, human
development theory includes analysis on economic growth, social
investment, empowerment of individuals, the provision of basic needs,
and political and cultural freedoms (UNDP 1998). Human development
involves access to education, food security, support for disabilities and
other illnesses, economic equality, and gender. Put simply, human
development is about facilitating and expanding people’s opportunities to
develop their potential and to live in accordance with their interests and
needs (Haq 1995). According to one of the key early exponents of human
development theory Mahbub Ul Haq (1995: 23), human development
theory is the ‘most holistic development model that exists today’. Yet
even the most holistic development model in existence has given little
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attention to the widespread effects of UXO contamination in many
developing countries.
The first HDR to be published on Laos was in 1998 and aimed to
measure standards of living conditions using the three elementary
requirements of life expectancy, education, and sufficient command over
resources for a decent life18 (UNDP 1998). However, despite UXO
contamination having a significantly negative affect on all three of these
measures it is given no consideration in this initial report. Since 1998,
two more HDR’s have been published on Laos, however, like the
majority of human development literature, both are insufficient in their
understanding and analysis of the effects of UXO contamination. Of the
three human development reports to have been published on Laos the
effects of UXO are discussed on less than five of the four hundred and
ninety-four pages that make up the three reports (UNDP 1998; UNDP
2001; UNDP 2006). Likewise, in the two HDR’s published on Vietnam,
no mention is given to UXO and its effect on socio-economic
development (UNDP 2001; UNDP 1998b). If human development theory
is to remain as the most holistic development model around, more

18

These three basic development requirements are used by the UNDP to create the Human

Development Index. Specifically, these variables include life expectancy at birth, a combined
measure of literacy and education enrolment, and per-capita income in purchasing power parity
(PPP) (UNDP 2006).
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research into the bodily and socio-economic effects of UXO in postconflict states is still required.

2.5 Unexploded Ordnance and the Body
The effects of UXO on the body is the most obvious and welldocumented

consequence

of

UXO

contamination.

International

organisations such as Landmine Monitor and the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have written numerous
publications on UXO casualty rates in contaminated countries. However,
while there has been much professional discourse written on UXO
casualties more academic attention is required from a sociological
perspective. In academic literature understandings on the causes of
conflict trauma have previously been restricted to occurrences of
violence and horror during the conflict period (Krippner & McIntyre
2003). However, in UXO contaminated countries the cause of trauma
remains embedded within the landscapes of people’s daily existence.
Every year thousands of civilians around the world are killed or injured
by unexploded ordnance. UXO accidents are often more fatal than
accidents with anti-personnel mines (APM) and according to Moyes et al.
(2002) in Eritrea seventy-two percent of deaths resulting from explosive
remnants of war were from UXO. Likewise in Afghanistan, Kosovo,
Vietnam and Cambodia UXO has caused equal or more deaths than
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APM’s. For those that do survive UXO accidents, injuries are often
severe and include multiple amputations, burns, puncture wounds,
deafness, and blindness (Moyes, et al. 2002). While treatment of these
injuries has featured heavily within medical research (Bendinelli 2009;
Kett & Mannion 2004; Young 2008), a review of this medical research is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Although UXO casualties affect all demographics, similar high risk
groups have been identified between contaminated states. According to
Borrie (2003), males aged between eighteen and forty are generally the
most at risk group for UXO accidents. This is true both for Southeast
Asia and for Sub-Saharan Africa, while in Kosovo Moyes and Nash
(2005) found that over ninety-four percent of casualties were male. In
addition to males, children are often also a high risk demographic and in
Kosovo almost two-thirds of casualties were children (Moyes et al. 2002:
7). Children are generally more at risk of UXO than Anti-Personnel
Mines (APM’s) and in Cambodia casualty rates for UXO were found by
to be three times higher than those resulting from APM’s (Moyes et al.
2002). Accidents with UXO often involve multiple casualties and in
many post-conflict states there is little or no capacity to deal with the
rehabilitation of survivors (Borrie 2003).
Although the physical effects of UXO have been well documented by
professional operators, even they have insufficiently explored the effects
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of fear on UXO affected societies. Fear of UXO presents a serious
obstacle to those overcoming the psychological trauma of war. Fear
prevents people from using potential agricultural land, and can affect
changes in community behaviours that may even lead to community
abandonment

(Borrie

2003).

While

fear

does

have

economic

consequences, equally important to human development is the effect of
fear on people’s everyday existence. In UXO contaminated areas people
live daily in fear of their surrounding environment and this fear has a
significant impact on the productiveness and happiness of communities.
Although often not considered as a priority because of other immediate
needs such as food shortages and the physical injuries resulting from
UXO accidents, the psychological effects of UXO on effected
populations must not be overlooked. As Moyes et al. (2002:14)
insightfully explain, ‘although UXO may not always be an outright
barrier to land use it is always a source of persistent fear’.

2.6 Socio-economic Effects of Unexploded Ordnance
One of the primary reasons that UXO is both a post-conflict issue and a
human development issue is because of the substantial socio-economic
effects that it creates. Similar socio-economic effects of UXO to those
caused by UXO in Laos can be seen in Kosovo, Lebanon, Sudan,
Pakistan, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, and various other
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countries in the Middle-East, Africa, Asia and the Pacific (Moyes 2007;
Moyes & Nash 2005). According to Borrie (2003), in Africa alone at
least twenty-four countries are socio-economically disadvantaged
because of UXO contamination. In UXO affected communities,
contamination prevents the use or rehabilitation of infrastructure and
community resources including housing irrigation systems, schools,
roads, clinics and markets, and destroys human capital by creating fear
and casualties amongst affected populations (Moyes et al. 2002). UXO
contamination places a burden on scarce medical resources and diverts
international assistance from other development needs sometimes for
many decades (Moyes et al. 2002). Yet despite these numerous and
widespread socio-economic effects there remains little consideration of
UXO contamination within human development theory. Understandings
of the effects of UXO both on the body and socio-economically remain
within the literature of professional UXO response organisations,
although even amongst these publications greater consideration of the
potential economic value of UXO contamination is required.
The relationship that post-conflict communities have with UXO
contamination often changes over time as new perceptions on the dangers
of UXO develop and as social and economic requirements change. In
many post-conflict societies where impoverished communities are faced
with few means of income generation or subsistence, UXO and other
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forms of war scrap have become a valuable economic resource. As
Moyes et al. (2002) explain, UXO provides an economic resource in two
key ways; firstly in salvaging or selling the metal from items of UXO
people can gain access to an otherwise unavailable cash income, and
secondly, people may also use the explosives from UXO in activities
such as fishing. Instead of being stigmatised as dangerous items to be
avoided, in many countries people engage daily with UXO and often
perceive this activity as no different to the many other risks that exist in
their daily lives (Borrie 2003). In Sudan, for example, Borrie (2003)
found that scrap metal salvaged from UXO is often used to make
traditional jewellery. Yet despite the potential benefits of scrap metal
collection, most development organisations have failed to develop
adequate responses to these informal economies. Likewise, international
guidelines for UXO response programs such as the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) do not differentiate in the recommendations for
risk education programs in UXO contaminated communities where scrap
metal collection exists despite the needs of these communities obviously
differing from countries where conflict has only recently settled. A
topical issue amongst both professional literature and development
operators, through the scrap metal trade UXO has become both an
inhibitor to development and an economic asset of affected communities.
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2.7 Conclusion
Post-conflict development is not the same as conflict free development.
In the final stage of post-conflict recovery successful development
practice requires a greater understanding of the relationship between
post-conflict theory and human development theory. However, while the
prevalence of post-conflict countries may have been acknowledged, the
specific development needs of post-conflict societies has not yet been
adequately explored by post-conflict theory or sufficiently integrated into
broader development strategies such as human development theory
(Junne & Verkoren 2005). In regards to UXO contamination, due to the
widespread and multi-sectorial effects that contamination has in the
consolidation phase of development, an understanding of how UXO
impedes human development is just as important to post-conflict
recovery as post-conflict theory’s assertions on the restoration of peace,
capacity building, and the rule of law (Chetail 2009). This is particularly
so in long-term contaminated countries such as Laos and Vietnam, where
others concerns of post-conflict theory regarding security and the
restoration of peace (Stoddard & Harmer 2005) have become largely
irrelevant. In such instances an understanding of how civil society
organisations are responding to the bodily and socio-economic effects of
UXO contamination is crucial.
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Chapter 3
- Methodology and Methods -

3.1 Introduction: From Theory to Methodological
Directions
The theoretical direction of this thesis has a lot of methodological
implications. To explore how civil society organisations are functioning
in Laos’ unexploded ordnance sector it is imperative that the perspectives
of operators within this field be considered. Following an analysis of the
literature on this topic, interviews of these individuals were thus
conducted. Similarly, interviewing participant’s from the UXO civil
society sector was necessary to consider how the UXO sector may
currently be improved as priority areas of UXO response actions change
over time. To examine the effects of UXO on human development and
achieve a holistic understanding of the multiple effects of UXO it is
essential to compare the similarities and differences in perceptions of the
seriousness of UXO contamination between UXO operators and those
who live daily with the threat of UXO. Likewise, non-physical aspects of
UXO contamination relevant to human development theory and certain
effects of UXO on the body, such as fear, could not be explored without
adopting a mixed method approach that included interviews and non-
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participant observation. Aware that knowledge of the effects of UXO
may differ between UXO operators and those who live in contaminated
landscapes, a constructivist methodological understanding of knowledge
as discursively produced, contingent, and dependent on context forms the
basis of this research (Denzin & Lincoln 2000). In adopting this
methodological standpoint the natural methods approach is to use mixed
methods and grounded theory processes of data collection. It is important
to clarify here that grounded theory methods, not methodology, were
applied and that as already mentioned, the underlying methodological
premises of the research are embedded in constructivism. The
fundamental principle of mixed methods research is that methods should
be mixed in a way that will provide complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009), and this was
achieved by constant comparison methods commonly used by grounded
theorists.

3.2 Sites of Research
3.2.1 Vientiane Municipality
Vientiane municipality is home to the Laotian capital of Vientiane city.
All the national offices for the various NGO’s, government organisations,
and private companies whose employees were interviewed for this
research were in Vientiane city. Conducting Interviews in Vientiane city
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allowed the researcher access to a wide range of participants and
secondary data sources. In providing access to such a wide range of
research participants, Vientiane city was the most suitable location for
arranging safe and ethical access to participants in one of Laos’ UXO
contaminated districts and was also the best location to have participant
information statements and consent forms professionally translated into
Lao script. With the National Rehabilitation Centre also being situated in
Vientiane, this research site also provided the opportunity to observe
UXO casualties who were receiving treatment and the provision of
prosthetic and orthotic devices.

3.2.2 Khammouane Province
Khammouane province is the fourth most contaminated province in Laos.
This province was chosen by the researcher for logistical purposes as
within the available research time period it was the most easily accessible
of the countries five most contaminated provinces. Research was
conducted in Eastern Khammouane province’s Nakai district where part
of the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran during the Second Indochina War. Nakai’s
landscape is a mixture of mountainous land and flat ground and is also
home to the World Bank’s Nam Theun II project. Farming, primarily of
rice, and fishing are the two main means of subsistence in the area.
Hunting, foraging, and the sale of scrap metal are also present. Of the
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seven hundred and five villages in Khammouane province surveyed
during HIB’s 1996 impact survey, nearly all reported UXO
contamination within the village territory (UXO Lao 2008). Furthermore
an analysis of UXO accidents from Khammouane province between
2003-2005 lists twenty-seven incidents, while a demand for cash in parts
of the province in recent years has led to an increase in the scrap metal
trade (Moyes 2005).

Figure 3.1 Bombing Data for Khammouane Province
(Courtesy PCL Bombing Data)
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3.3 Data Collection:
3.3.1 Primary Data
Primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews and nonparticipant observation during three weeks of field research in Laos from
the 31/05/09 to 22/06/09. This time period is at the beginning of Laos’
wet season. It was the researchers second time both in Laos, and going
into the field with a UXO team in a rural Lao province and this
familiarity with local customs and UXO operating procedures facilitated
the quality of the research. As the researcher spoke only the most basic
Lao a professional translator was used to interview Lao nationals and all
consent forms and participant information statements were translated into
Lao. Seventeen interviews were conducted in total and research
participants were divided by the researcher into two distinct groups.
Group one was a purposive sample of key actors currently working in
various roles in Laos’ UXO sector that were knowledgeable in the effects
of UXO. Group two was a purposive random sample of Lao nationals
who lived in a heavily UXO contaminated rural district and experienced
the effects of UXO as a part of their everyday lived experience.
Specifically, participants from group two were from the Nakai district of
Khammouane Province. Group one contained ten participants and group
two contained seven participants.
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To aid the flow of communication, sixteen of the seventeen participant
interviews were recorded with an electronic device and transcribed later
that day. In addition to recordings observational notes were taken shortly
after the completion of interviews. One participant requested that they
were not recorded and in this instance notes were taken during the
interview. This participant also requested their responses be considered
as personal and not as representing the organisation they worked for and
this confidentiality request was also maintained. Interview times varied
from approximately sixty minutes to just fifteen minutes, and shorter
responses were generally received from participants from Nakai. The
wide variation in interview times resulted from some participants
evaluating further on their answers than others, and the researcher asking
for additional information or clarification. Between groups, the shorter
answers from Laotians in Nakai was primarily a result of more
simplistic/direct questions intended to ease confusion in Language
translations and a rural Lao verbal culture that does not encourage drawn
out answers. Interview questions varied between groups; however, in
general they concerned the effect of UXO on development, work within
the UXO sector, risk education procedures, and the scrap metal trade19.
Different respondents were asked for more information depending on
their specific knowledge of each of these topic areas. All participants
19

For a full list of Interview questions see Annex 1.
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were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time and
could also have their responses removed from the research at any time
before the submission date.

3.3.1.1 Participants:
3.3.1.1.1 Group One
The ten participants from group one were all key actors in the UXO
sector in Laos. Participants included six males and four females and
varied in age from between twenty-five to eighty. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted in cafes or restaurants around Vientiane at
times that most suited participants time schedules. Participants were from
international organisations, national organisations, Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGO’s), and a private UXO clearance company.
Furthermore, participants were also from organisations involved in the
IMAS five pillars of UXO action, namely, clearance, risk education,
victim assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy against the use of
cluster munitions. Initial participants from group one were recruited by
email and provided with the researchers intentions. A passive snowballing technique whereby existing participants would recommend others
that the researcher should speak with was used to contact the remainder
of participants. Using email as a means of contact allowed participants to
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feel free from coercion and all participants were voluntarily involved in
the research and were not paid.
Participants included;


The program officer for the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in
Laos.



The Laos UXO program co-ordinator for Handicap International
Belgium (HIB).



The Co-founder of the Cooperative Orthotic Prosthetic Enterprise
(COPE), an occupational therapist for COPE and an Australian
volunteer for COPE.



The United Nations Develop Program (UNDP) Senior Technical
Advisor to the NRA20 and the Mine/UXO risk education officer
for the NRA.



The UNDP Senior Technical Advisor to UXO LAO.



Phoenix Clearance Limited (PCL) operations manager.



An anonymous employee of an international organisation.

3.3.1.1.2 Group Two
Participants from group two were Laotians from the heavily
contaminated Nakai district in Khammouane Province. All were aged
between twenty and seventy and only one was female. All spoke very
20

The full name of the NRA is The National Regulatory Authority for the UXO/Mine Action Sector
in Lao PDR
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little or no English and all responses were translated by the researcher’s
translator. Four were PCL deminer's who lived in Nakai and three were
local villagers who were familiar with members of the UXO sector
coming to speak with them. Two were UXO survivors and one had lost
five members of their family as a direct result of UXO accidents. As with
group one all participation was voluntary and participants were not paid.
For all participants of group two UXO contamination was part of their
everyday lived experience and in some way or another has an effect on
their lives. Participants from group two were contacted through PCL, a
private UXO clearance company operating in Nakai district who were
familiar with the local people and ensured the safety of the researcher.
PCL provided a translator to assist the researcher by translating both the
interviewer questions and the participant’s answers. The translator,
whom was already familiar with the local people chosen to interview,
would approach the interviewees firstly by himself and ask if they were
happy to be involved in the study. If they agreed, the researcher would
then be invited to approach and conduct the interview. In this way
feelings of coercion for participants were mediated. Interviews were
conducted in various locations of the participant’s home villages such as
rice fields and outside family homes. Interviewing individuals already
familiar with the researcher’s translator and with actors from the UXO
sector facilitated discussion. To ensure informed consent, participant

51

information statements and consent forms were translated into Lao by a
translator employed by COPE and were also explained by the
researcher’s translator prior to interviewing. To ensure confidentiality,
the names of all participants from group two have been changed.

3.3.2 Secondary Data
Fieldwork in Laos also involved the collection of secondary data and this
material was gathered through the analysis of both academic and
professional publications. Documents from various UN agencies (UNDP,
UNMAS, UNESCAP, UNIDIR), the World Bank, CIA World Fact book
and Lao Government organisations (UXO LAO, NRA) were used
alongside secondary sources from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and other NGO’s (MAG, HIB,
COPE). Academic journal articles and books, media documents, and
electronic media were used, as were online searches once the researcher
had returned to Sydney. Sampling of text included literature on postconflict theory and human development theory, as well as development
in Laos and Southeast Asia. Publications concerning UXO contamination
in various post-conflict countries and UXO contamination specifically in
Laos were also consulted.
Throughout the analysis of literature research summaries and a paper trail
were used to develop themes and concepts. To formulate a thorough
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understanding of literary sources, sampling was used for words, themes,
writers, ideological stances, and subject topics. Descriptive coding was
initially used to gather material and following this topic coding was used
to spread material out. Analytical and In Vivo coding were used to
discover emergent themes in the literature alongside key word searches
for terms such as UXO, unexploded ordnance, ERW, and explosive
remnants of war. Once theoretical understandings had been formulated
tree catalogues were used to hierarchically categorise data and from these
catalogues the scrap metal trade and risk education emerged as priority
areas of research. Once these core variables had emerged, theoretical
coding was used to develop greater understanding and provide a
theoretical model to the data. Finally a literature map of all secondary
sources was used to position my research within the broader academic
fields of post-conflict theory and human development theory.

3.4 Research Constraints
The most significant constraint to the research was time. Although
sufficient data was collected in just three weeks in Laos more time would
have been beneficial for the researcher to build stronger relationships
with participants from group two. Greater trust and stronger relationships
with these participants may have resulted in more in depth responses and
a wider range of participants. Expanding the study to more than one

53

contaminated province may also have been beneficial in providing a
more balanced perspective on the effect of UXO contamination for rural
Lao. A second restraint was the use of a translator from PCL. While
beneficial for participant recruitment, villager’s familiarity with this
individual may have caused them to skew their responses and exaggerate
the effects of UXO in order not to offend the translator or risk
jeopardising the clearance of their farmland. Thirdly, research was
conducted in the wet season only and as Binns (2006) indicates, may
have produced different results to research conducted in the dry season.
This is particularly so in regards to the scrap metal trade as it is primarily
a dry season activity. Finally, in group two only one female was
interviewed and this may have resulted in some gender bias in regards to
participants responses about at risk groups for UXO collection, although
the answers provided by this participant were in accordance with other
participants and professional literature sources.
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Chapter 4
- Examining Civil Society: Laos’ Unexploded Ordnance
Sector -

They dropped the bombs. They don’t belong to us and I want
them to take them back.
- Young Boy, (Bomb Harvest 2007)

4.1 Introduction
From international organisations, to local institutions, NGO’s and private
companies, Laos’ UXO sector includes a multiplicity of civil society
organisations intent on addressing the International Mine Action
Standards ‘five pillars21’ of UXO/Mine action. As mentioned in Chapter
Two, the IMAS are the UN approved best practice framework for the
creation and implementation of UXO/Mine action programs in all UXO

21

According to the International Mine Action Standards the five pillars of mine action are;
removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war and the marking or fencing
off of areas contaminated with them; mine-risk education to help people understand the risks
they face, that they can identify mines and explosive remnants of war and learn how to stay out
of harm's way; medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims including job skills
training and employment opportunities; advocating for a world free from the threat of
landmines and encouraging countries to participate in international treaties and conventions
designed to end the production, trade, shipment or use of mines and to uphold the rights of
persons with disabilities; helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by
international agreements, such as the 1999 anti-personnel mine-ban treaty (E-mine 2009).
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contaminated countries. Designed through a series of consultative
activities that involved a broad spectrum of UXO/Mine action
stakeholders, the IMAS outline five key pillars for UXO responses that
include; UXO clearance, UXO risk education, victim assistance,
stockpile destruction, and advocacy against the use of mines (or in Laos’
case, cluster munitions). In Laos, as in most UXO contaminated states, a
national program has been created based on the IMAS and various civil
society organisations are working to ensure that IMAS’ five pillars are
implemented.
As of 2006 the principal organisational body for UXO/Mine action in
Laos has been the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and according
to the NRA in 2008 there were four humanitarian and three private
operators working in UXO clearance and a further five operators working
in other areas of the sector. Using the IMAS guidelines as a framework
for analysis, this chapter will asses the performance of Laos’ UXO sector
and where the sector may require further support. To achieve this
understanding, this chapter will be split into two sections; Section One
will provide an overview of the key operators working in Laos UXO
sector and the current services provided by these organisations and,
following this; Section Two will provide a critique of current practices
within the UXO sector alongside some recommendations for future
actions. Finally, in the conclusion of this chapter a brief critique of the
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IMAS guidelines as a best practice framework will also be provided. As
this thesis is concerned with the effects of UXO on development only the
first three pillars of clearance, risk education, and victim assistance will
be addressed. Although stockpile destruction and advocacy against the
use of cluster munitions are indeed an important part of any countries
response to UXO contamination it is not within the scope of this thesis to
explore Laos’ response to these pillars.

4.2 Section One: Operations and Operators
4.2.1 Laos Unexploded Ordnance Sector
In 2008 176,997 items of UXO were cleared in Laos and 373,762 people
participated in risk education activities (Sisawath et al. 2008). Clearance
of agricultural land remains as the most important priority, although
clearance is also conducted for educational facilities, communal and
government facilities, public infrastructure, tourism sites, and private
business. In addition to official clearance a considerable amount of
unregulated clearance continues to be conducted by local people all over
Laos, although land cleared by such means lacks guidelines and cannot
therefore be considered as safe (GICHD 2003). Overall, the UXO sector
in Laos is functioning well, although victim assistance for UXO
survivors is substantially inadequate and new approaches are needed for
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risk education programs. This is particularly so in regards to the
management of risk reduction within the scrap metal trade.

4.2.2 Bilateral Funding and the United 8ations
The UNDP provide staff and funding to both the NRA and UXO Lao.
The UNDP has been involved in the UXO sector in Laos for a period of
thirteen years and supports UXO activities as one part of four key target
areas (UNDP 2009). Essentially, the role of the UNDP in regards to
UXO activities is to assist in the mobilisation and coordination of
international assistance to Laos’ UXO sector, to provide technical advice
and support, and to help ensure that donor resources are used efficiently
and effectively (UNDP 2008). In addition to the UNDP, the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is also involved in UXO risk
education

programs

and

works

in

partnership

with

World

Education/Consortium (WEC), Lao Youth Union and the Ministry of
Education. Funding of Laos’ UXO sector also includes bilateral donors22,
and in 2007 Australia donated $AU5.07 million to UXO activities as part
of a larger five year development program (GICHD 2008).

22

Bilateral Donors refers to countries that channel resources directly to aid recipient countries

or through the financing of multilateral agencies.
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4.2.3 The Government of Laos
Throughout much of the literature on the UXO sector in Laos it is argued
that the Government of Laos (GoL) needs to increase its financial
commitment to UXO action. However, while this argument is in support
of arguments by post-conflict theorists (Del Castillo 2008; Chetail 2009)
even thirty-four years after the last major conflict in Laos these claims
are injudicious. Laos is an LDC with numerous development issues and
demanding increased financial input from the GoL is unrealistic and
inconsiderate of other development priorities.
Considering its capabilities, the GoL’s commitment to the UXO sector
has not been unreasonable, and includes important policy and operational
support networks that are absent in many other post-conflict states. UXO
Lao and the NRA, for example, are both national programs partially
funded by the GoL and run by the Ministry of Social Welfare and the
Office of the Prime Minister respectively (Griffin, Keeley & Sayyasouk
2008). All UXO Lao and NRA facilities, electricity and water are
provided by the government, as is the Cooperative Orthotic Prosthetic
Enterprise’s (COPE) facilities. In regards to UXO/Mine risk education,
the Ministry of Education is working with WEC to implement risk
education programs in national primary schools. Internationally, the
government of Laos has been strongly supportive of advocacy against the
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use of cluster munitions and on March 18, 2009 Laos was the second
state to ratify the international treaty against cluster munitions.
According to several participants of this study one issue that the GoL
should immediately improve upon is the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) process. All NGO’s working in Laos must obtain an MOU before
they can begin operations and this process can take anywhere between
six to eighteen months to be approved. As UNDP Senior Technical
Advisor to the NRA, Mr. Tim Horner, states,

Ausaid will allocate a certain amount of money and this will have
to be done in a fiscal year. Often the MOU will take longer than
this and as a result the money is nominated elsewhere. This means
Laos is losing money that is so difficult to get.
(02 June 2009)

Likewise there are some instances where the GoL could also be more
supportive of organisations already operating in Laos. In 2009, for
example, the GoL destroyed a COPE rehabilitation centre in Luang
Prabang to sell the site for private development. Finally, the government
response to victim assistance is one UXO action pillar in need of greater
commitment. The government does provide the National Rehabilitation
Centre (NRC) in Vientiane; however, in most other provinces health care
services are under-resourced and understaffed. Instead of greater
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financial commitment what may be needed from the GoL (and from the
sector in general) is a reconsideration of how existing resources should
be allocated.

4.2.4 8ational Operators:
4.2.4.1 The 8ational Regulatory Authority for the
UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR
The NRA is the national UXO/mine action authority for Laos and is
responsible for the coordination of all operators working in the UXO
sector. The NRA facilitates international partnerships and Laos’
ratification of treaties such as the cluster munitions treaty. The NRA also
conducts research on the effects of UXO contamination and although not
necessarily in its mandate, if possible NRA Senior Technical Advisor,
Mr. Tim Horner, would like to expand research into the effects of
herbicides and defoliants that were also used during the Second
Indochina War (02 June 2009). Quality assurance and the setting of
operational standards for the UXO sector is also a responsibility of the
NRA and, although currently unsustainable and funded primarily by the
UNDP, the NRA has proven to be a valuable addition to the UXO sector
(GICHD 2007). Furthermore, it has been argued by Griffin et al. (2008:
79) that given the time bound nature of UXO contamination the NRA
should remain partially supported by the UNDP.
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4.2.4.2 UXO Lao
UXO Lao is Laos’ national clearance operator and works in the country’s
nine most UXO contaminated provinces23. UXO Lao is the largest
clearance operator in Laos and since it began operations in 1996 it has
cleared more than 800,000 items of UXO. In addition to clearance, UXO
Lao has also conducted risk education sessions in at least 6,659 villages
(UXO Lao 2009). Despite these achievements UXO Lao is arguably also
the UXO organisation in need of the most changes and indeed in many
provinces where UXO Lao operate their procedures have remained
largely unchanged for over a decade (GICHD 2007). In 2008 UXO Lao
roving teams failed to reach their targets and according to Griffin et al.
(2008) an increase in roving teams to meet future targets is essential.
Furthermore, UXO Lao staff appear to have an aversion towards large
bombs and in Saravane province a backlog of one hundred and thirty
large aircraft bombs remain to be cleared. Internal quality assurance of
all operations needs to be improved by UXO Lao, and in particular the
organisation must improve data collection on the implementation of risk
education sessions (Griffin et al. 2008).

UXO Lao currently has

community awareness volunteers for risk education operating in eight
provinces; however, Griffin et al. (2008) have shown that the program is

23

The nine most contaminated provinces are Savannaket, Xiengkhouan, Saravane,
Khammouane, Houaphan, Sekong, Champassak, Attapeu, and Luang Prabang (UXO Lao 2009).
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reaching diminishing returns. Like the NRA, UXO Lao is funded
primarily by the UNDP and its workforce of over one thousand
employees includes eight international advisors (UXO Lao 09).

4.2.5 8on-Governmental Organisations:
4.2.5.1 Clearance and Risk Education Operators
As the most established and experienced humanitarian clearance operator
in Laos, MAG have been working in clearance, roving, and risk
education since 1994. At present MAG operates eleven clearance teams
and nine community liaison teams. In support of gender equality, two of
MAG’s eleven clearance teams are all female and thirty-three percent of
MAG Lao’s total workforce are female (MAG 2009). MAG’s clearance
is always interrelated with development and according to MAG's
program officer in Laos, Mr. Gregory Cathcart,

A recent post-clearance assessment by MAG found that a
satisfactory level of development was occurring on approximately
ninety-five percent of MAG clearance sites from between 2007 and
January 2009.
(09 June 2009)
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As well as employing and training local staff MAG use village assisted
clearance teams to remove vegetation from contaminated land. MAG is
also involved in risk education although according to Mr. Gregory
Cathcart MAG is looking to scale down its current risk education
program to only target at risk groups (09 June 2009). Alongside MAG,
the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) is also involved in a
considerable level of clearance and roving activities. FSD were the first
clearance company to receive full accreditation from the NRA and their
clearance work is primarily in support of the World Food Programme
(Sisawath et al. 2008). In addition to clearance, FSD provide risk
education and other training programs and seek to create alternative
forms of income for rural Lao.

4.2.5.2 Victim Assistance Operators
COPE provides the most comprehensive, nationwide, victim assistance
service currently available in Laos (UNDP 2008). Although COPE work
with patients that have a variety of disabilities and are not strictly limited
to treatment of UXO casualties, according to the Co-founder of COPE,
Mr. Mike Boddington, over forty percent of COPE’s patients are UXO
survivors (07 June 2009). In addition to providing corrective surgery,
prosthesis, and orthotic devices, COPE is also involved in the skills
training of local staff. COPE now have fourteen Laotian (international
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standard) prostheses working for them. COPE pay all patient costs,
including transportation, accommodation, and food for the patient and
one carer, as well as the costs of any necessary surgery and of course the
prosthetic or orthotic device. According to a COPE Occupational
Therapist, Ms Jo Pereira, COPE does not consider itself as a service
provider, rather its objective is to subsidise government services and
improve the skills of national healthcare workers. As Ms Pereira states,

Our objective is to subsidize the service that the government
provides and that is very much the message that we try and get out
there. We support local peoples endeavours in meeting the needs of
their fellow countrymen.
(18 June 2009)

In addition to the GoL, COPE also work in partnership with the
Association for Aid Relief Japan (AAR) at the National Rehabilitation
Centre. AAR builds wheelchairs and other disability devices. HIB also
provide some minor victim assistance services and are substantially
involved in risk education strategies and programs. HIB are involved in
some clearance activities and small scale community development
programs (Sisawath et al. 2008). Finally, WEC also provide educational
and vocational training to rural Lao and provide some assistance in the
treatment of UXO survivors (Sisawath et al. 2008).
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4.2.5.3 Private Operators
There are three private UXO clearance operators (BACTEC, Milsearch,
and PCL) currently working in Laos. These operators work primarily for
other private companies and clear land for mining and hydro-electric
projects. BACTEC and PCL have, however, also been involved in
community risk education and roving tasks and provided non-financial
support to HIB and COPE (Sisawath et al. 2008). Similarly to MAG,
BACTEC uses village assisted clearance to provide economic support to
local people, while PCL have been involved in a wetland restoration
project in Khammouane province (Landmine Monitor 2008). In 2008
Milsearch and PCL cleared 1,067 and 1,975 items of UXO respectively.
Considering that these three private clearance companies are operating in
Laos, it may be beneficial to the UXO sectoral response for NGO’s to
scale down their levels of clearance and focus more on issues such as
victim assistance or the improvement of risk education strategies. Having
provided an overview of UXO operators and activities within Laos UXO
sector, Section Two of this chapter will now consider where the UXO
sector is in need of greater support.
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4.3 Section Two: Strengthening IMAS’ Pillars
4.3.1 Expanding Victim Assistance
While clearance, stockpile destruction, and advocacy against the use of
cluster munitions (if not landmines) appear to be well functioning in
Laos, victim assistance and risk education are two UXO action ‘pillars’
that require a more adequate response. The list of organisations some
way involved in victim assistance is extensive and includes the Ministry
of Health, The Ministry of Social Welfare, HIB, AAR, COPE, Lao
Disabled Peoples Association and WEC. However, most of these
organisations operate on small budgets, conduct other activities as well as
victim assistance, and work with many individuals whose impairments
are not the result of UXO. Working across a broad range of issues with
limited staff and limited funding the response for UXO survivors and
their families is far from adequate. As COPE occupational therapist, Ms.
Jo Pereira succinctly explains,

I think the health systems are struggling to cope, but they are
here and I think again compared to a lot of countries in a
post-conflict situation where there is nothing, Laos does
already have a lot of the shape of the infrastructure if not all
of the investment that is needed in it.
(18 June 2009)
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In regards to government institutions there is no sufficient system for the
treatment of UXO casualties, no vocational training or education
programs and no national UXO casualties database (GICHD 2007).
Patients must pay for all government provided healthcare and UXO
casualties are often amongst the poorest of the population. In addition to
the physical injuries of UXO accidents is the psychological trauma that
many accident victims experience and psychological support for UXO
survivors is the most deficient area of victim assistance in Laos.
Mental health support services in Laos are extremely limited with only
two psychiatrists for the whole population (BNBR 2008). Neither COPE,
AAR, nor the GoL have psycho-social support programs for UXO
survivors. Lao Disabled People’s Association do have self help groups
for the disabled, however, these have no specific focus on UXO survivors
and are poorly managed and funded. HIB has a rehabilitation program in
Savannakhet province and have recently published a report about the
psycho-social effects of UXO accidents on children. According to this
report no child survivors of UXO accidents, or their families, had
received any psychological support other than traditional healing
practices within their villages. Only one small mental health unit exists in
Vientiane and despite the fact that UXO survivors are generally from
remote rural areas there are no mental health services at the provincial or
district level (HIB 2004). One organisation called Basic Needs, Basic
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Rights are just beginning to become involved in mental health in Laos,
however, they have no specific focus on UXO survivors. In fact, their
first ‘base-line’ study made no mention of UXO related trauma and was
conducted in Vientiane municipality where UXO casualties are rare.
Urgent action is needed to provide psychological support to UXO
survivors and their families, and according to HIB (2004) attempts to do
so should operate primarily through existing health services. Basic Needs
Basic Rights should consider expanding its work into UXO contaminated
provinces and increase communication with organisations such as COPE,
HIB, AAR, and WEC who could (with sufficient training) identify and
refer patients to them. In addition HIB (2004) has suggested that the
National University of Laos develop a psychology program.

4.3.2 Re-orienting Risk Education
According to the IMAS, the term Mine/UXO risk education (RE) refers
to ‘educational activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from
mines and UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change,
including public information dissemination, education and training, and
community mine action liaison’ (IMAS 07.11, 55). Providing RE to
affected communities is an important part of the ongoing efforts to
reduce the negative impacts of UXO (UNDP 2008) and has been
conducted in Laos for over a decade. A requirement of the cluster
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munitions treaty that Laos recently ratified, according to Laos’ national
strategic plan for mine/UXO action there are four key priorities involved
in risk education; to ensure focus is on high risk groups and high risk
areas; to make RE sustainable; to effectively coordinate and manage the
RE program; and to effectively monitor the program. To achieve these
four priorities, RE has the three primary components of public
information dissemination, education and training, and community
liaison (GICHD 2007b). In 2008 RE was conducted in Laos by a variety
of institutions and NGO’s including the Ministry of Education and WEC,
UXO Lao, MAG, HIB, World Vision, UNICEF, and the Lao Youth
Union (Griffin et al. 2008). Of these operators, WEC and the Ministry of
Education reached the most people at 160,134, while UXO Lao reached
145,332 people and MAG reached 12,148 people (Sisawath et al. 2008).
Yet despite the large number of people receiving risk education activities
in Laos a 2008 report by Griffin et al. has challenged the appropriateness
and effectiveness of current RE activities. According to the report,
community awareness programs could only be considered cost effective
if every person that heard RE messages immediately modified their
behaviour. Such levels of effectiveness are unlikely, however,
particularly considering that many individuals who were likely to modify
their behaviour have probably already done so (Griffin et al. 2008). With
over thirty years of living every day with the presence of UXO, the
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majority of rural Lao are aware of the potential danger of this material
and engage with UXO out of necessity or choice rather than ignorance.
Of existing RE practices only community liaison24 remains important
although in 2007 new materials targeting high risk groups were
developed by the NRA, MAG and UNICEF. As the Mine Risk Education
Operator for the NRA, Mr. Thongdy Phommavongsa states:

We have a strategy now regarding behavioural change rather than
raising UXO awareness… children are our main concern… the
main thing we are trying to address now is the scrap metal trade.
(22 June 2009)

Although these materials are still in the initial stages of implementation
their likelihood of success is much greater than for previous programs.

4.4 Conclusion
To address the five pillars of UXO/Mine action outlined by the IMAS,
Laos’ UXO sector includes a variety of civil society organisations. A

24

Community liaison refers to the system and procedures used to exchange information
between national activities, UXO organisations, and local communities. They enable local
communities to be informed when clearance is planned to take place, the nature and duration
of the task, and the exact locations to be cleared (IMAS, 0.711). More an information exchange
than the provision of ‘education’, community liaison teams establish a connection with local
villagers and inform them of clearance teams in the area as well as discussing which areas are of
the highest priority for clearance.
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valuable broad framework, the IMAS provides a suitable guideline for
UXO action in Laos so long as the level of response to each pillar is
prioritised according to country specific needs. As has been shown in this
chapter, UXO clearance is well established and well functioning in Laos,
although success levels vary between organisations and institutions. Risk
education is provided by many operators in Laos, however, until recently
the message it has provided has been largely inappropriate for the
extensiveness of UXO contamination. As will be shown further in
Chapter Six, people’s responses to UXO contamination in Laos have
changed over time and, until recently, risk education programs have
failed to adapt to these behavioural changes. While it cannot be expected
of a worldwide best practice framework to provide guidance on the
variances in the effects of UXO contamination in all affected countries,
Laos need to reappropriate its risk education strategies highlights that the
IMAS need to be shaped to fit post-conflict countries specific
contamination problems. In Laos, such contextualising of the IMAS
framework may involve a reconsideration of the relative importance of
UXO pillars such as stockpile destruction and advocacy against the use
of cluster munitions that are less immediate needs than greater
government and NGO involvement in victim assistance. Furthermore, if
private clearance companies were able to receive donor funding for
clearance it may be beneficial to UXO action in Laos for NGO’s such as
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MAG and FSD to scale down their clearance activities and focus more on
roving tasks, victim assistance, and developing more successful risk
education programs. This is particularly so in regards to the virtual nonexistence of psychological support for UXO casualties and their families.
Most importantly of all, operators in the UXO sector must continue to
research and improve their responses to Laos’ scrap metal trade. As Laos
continues to expand and develop socio-economically the effects of UXO
and local people’s responses to contamination will continue to transform.
For a successful response to UXO contamination, the UXO sector must
likewise adapt to these changes. Having explored how the civil society
response to UXO contamination is functioning in Laos the effects of
UXO on Laos’ development will now be considered.

73

Chapter 5
-Unexploded Ordnance and the Body-

UXO is the biggest problem. When you are hungry you don't
die, but when a bomb explodes you die.
(Mrs Phaengkham, 25 June 2009)

5.1 Introduction
All across Laos people live daily with the threat of unexploded munitions
that distort the divisions between peace and conflict and since 1975 total
UXO casualties have exceeded 50,00025 (Nixon 2007: 163; Sisawath et
al. 2008). More recently, over the past decade the average amount of
UXO casualties per year has been two hundred and eighty-nine people
and numerous accounts of UXO accidents can be seen throughout the
reports of NGO’s working in contaminated areas (Sisawath et al. 2008).
As has already been stated, UXO casualty rates have increased in recent
years and based on existing data, it appears that casualty rates continued
to increase in 2008. In addition to the physical injuries of UXO,
25

Until 2008, the best information available on the total number of casualties as a result of UXO
accidents was about fourteen thousand. With the work of the National Survey of UXO Victims
and Accidents, it is now known that the true number is over fifty thousand. Considering underreporting it may in fact be as high as sixty-five thousand (Sisawath et al. 2008).
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psychological trauma is also widespread amongst Laotians who live in
contaminated districts. This chapter will explore the physical and
psychological effects of UXO on the body.

5.2 The Physical effects of Unexploded Ordnance
UXO contamination continues to kill and injure civilians throughout
Laos on an almost daily basis. Of the seven participants from Nakai
interviewed for this research all could recollect accidents that had
occurred in their home district. Two participants were themselves UXO
survivors and Mr. Simsomsouk had lost both of his arms and one eye in a
UXO accident. Another participant who was not herself a UXO survivor
had five of her family members killed in UXO accidents. As is common
within professional literature, the causes of the accidents ranged from
deliberate interaction with UXO to coming into contact with UXO when
farming and unknowingly building a fire above buried UXO.
Participant’s injuries included amputation, loss of eyesight, damaged
hearing, and ongoing discomfort from shrapnel embedded beneath the
skin. These injuries often cause pain and discomfort for the remainder of
people’s lives and impede human development by reducing the future
outputs of these individuals.
Although this study was able to interview two survivors of UXO
accidents, in many instances those involved in UXO accidents do not
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survive. Approximately one third of UXO casualties die almost
immediately following accidents with UXO while many more have died
because they were unable to reach a hospital (Cave et al. 2006). Due to
the main activities associated with UXO accidents being ‘playing’ or
‘tampering’, approximately sixty-five percent of survivors require upper
limb amputations (HIB 2004). Furthermore, individuals who have lost
limbs

or

are

disabled

from

UXO

accidents

often

encounter

marginalisation from society, loss of education and employment, as well
as limited relationship prospects. Difficulties in returning to work
following UXO accidents were mentioned both by Mr. Simsomsouk and
Mr. Khamphong as is seen in the following two comments:

Now I am very poor because I lost both arms and one eye and
my other eye is not so clear. I cannot work very good and I
have so many children and it is hard to find food to feed
them.
(Mr Simsomsouk 26 June 2009)

When I was working a bomb exploded and made me blind in
one eye and damaged my shoulder, my stomach, and my arm.
When I am working now I cannot work to one hundred
percent.
(Mr Khamphong 24 June 2009)
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Should the definition used by the 2008 convention on cluster munitions
be applied, that ‘cluster munitions victims means all persons who have
been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss,
social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their
rights…. [Including] persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as
well as their affected families and communities’, the majority of the
Laotian population would qualify as victims.

5.3 Unexploded Ordnance and Psychological Trauma
One of the more difficult to measure and less recognised humanitarian
effects of UXO contamination is the fear people experience from living
in UXO contaminated areas. A problem that affects not only UXO
survivors but almost all individuals who live in contaminated districts,
fear of UXO was mentioned by all participants from Nakai district. Fear
of hitting UXO while farming, fear for the safety of their children and
family members, fear from seeing others who have suffered from UXO
accidents, and fears about returning to work were all mentioned as effects
of UXO. Some examples of how fear limits both socio-economic outputs
and peoples everyday lived experience can be seen in the following two
remarks by Mrs. Phaengkham and Mr. Somsak:
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I am very scared of bombs at the moment because my son inlaw died from bomb fishing and my three grandchildren died
[from a UXO accident] in Talang.
(Mrs Phaengkham, 25 June 2009)

People injured by bombs are afraid to return to work and
people who see so many others [who have been] injured or
died because of bombs are also scared to work in the area.
(Mr Somsak 24 June 2009)

Likewise NGOs operating in the UXO sector have received many
accounts of fear from UXO by those living in contaminated areas and the
effect of this fear has a serious impact on people’s abilities to expand
their opportunities and develop their potential.
For those who have experienced the trauma of a UXO accident the
psychological effects are often substantial, including flashbacks, anxiety,
depression, alcohol dependency, drug use, nightmares, poor memory, and
learning difficulties (HIB 2004). It is not uncommon for UXO survivors
to avoid the place where their accident occurred and psychological
effects of UXO accidents may in turn lead to social exclusion and/or loss
of employment (GICHD 2007b). The impact of fear on the human
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development of UXO contaminated societies in Laos may be the most
overlooked effect of UXO contamination.

5.4 Risk Taking and Risk Aversion
Presented with no viable economic alternatives, many people in Laos are
forced to farm, forage and search for scrap metal on UXO contaminated
land (Kett & Mannion 2004). While such risk-taking is understandable in
a country where malnutrition affects one in every two children (WFP
2007), it does increase the likelihood of already impoverished
communities experiencing UXO accidents and, as a result, facing greater
poverty in the future (GICHD 2007b). Survivors after often unable to
return to the same work that they did before UXO accidents and
considering that a large majority of casualties are young males, accidents
often affect families and villages principal income earners (Cave et al.
2006). In some instances people have developed risk aversion strategies
for farming such as using buffaloes instead of tractors and only digging a
few centimetres into the soil, however, these methods reduce the overall
productivity of farming. Mr. Somsak provides one example of a simple
risk aversion strategy and the effect it has on subsistence:

So when you are working in the bush you must work
carefully, work carefully with your machete, and people are
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scared of a bomb exploding. So it is difficult to survive and
there is not enough food.
(24 June 2009)

5.5 High Risk Demographics
The overwhelming majority of UXO casualties in Laos are male and in
2008 males accounted for eighty-one percent of total casualties.
According to both professional literature and many participants from
Nakai district this is most likely the result of men’s greater involvement
in more physical agricultural work and because they are more likely to
deliberately handle UXO:

Normally the problem is with men, who work hard and use
the hoe.
(Mr. Saengchan 24 June 2009)

Men have to do so much work that puts them at risk of hitting
a bomb.
(Mr Khamphong 24 June 2009)

Amongst males, young men and boys are particularly at risk of
deliberately handling UXO and it has been suggested that this is due to a
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combination of their inquisitive nature and attempts at social bravado
(UNIDIR 2008). As Nakai is a district where people’s subsistence is
highly dependent on fishing, further reasons given for men handling
UXO by participants from Nakai was to extract explosives for use in
fishing. A common finding within many post-conflict countries (Borrie
2003), using explosives for fishing is generally incorporated by
professional literature as part of the scrap metal trade and participation in
the scrap metal trade is also another common cause for increased casualty
rates amongst males.
Children of both sexes report higher UXO casualties than adults and the
proportion of child casualties in Laos has increased in recent years (Cave
et al. 2006). From 1964 to 2008 child casualties were less than thirty-nine
percent, however, in the last decade the figure has increased to over fifty
percent (UXO Lao 2009). One reason given for this by Kingshill (1991)
and Murphy (1999) is that the BLU-26 sub-munition resembles a Lao
fruit (see figure 5.1) or a small ball that children will try to play with
(Kingshill 1991; Murphy 1999). In support of this idea, fifty-one percent
of recent child casualties were the result of sub-munitions compared to
only twenty-eight percent of all adult casualties. Although most child
casualties do not survive, many of those who do face difficulties fitting
back into their communities or families (HIB 2004).
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In this study, all participants from Nakai identified children and men as
the most ‘at risk’ groups. One participant recalled a recent UXO accident
involving three boys in Khammouane province while Kim Warren from
HIB described a recent UXO accident where nine children were injured:

Last year in January there was an accident in one of our
target villages. Nine kids involved, five died, four survived.
They were throwing stones at a dead cow and one of the kids
picked up a bombie, he didn't know it was a bombie, and
threw it at the cow.
(14 June 2009).

Such multiple casualties are common of UXO accidents in many
contaminated countries (Borrie 2003), however, it is concerning for
development that the majority of UXO casualties in Laos were born long
after conflict had ceased (UNDP 2008).

Figure 5.1 Fruit (Left) that resembles UXO cluster sub-munitions (right).
(Photographs by Kearrin Sims)
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5.6 Conclusion
Due to its poor socio-economic status Laos is in many senses a risk
society abounding in potential livelihoods shocks (Beck 1992). None are
more immediately devastating, however, than the effects of a UXO
accident. Although a nationwide problem, UXO contamination has the
greatest impact on those who are already disadvantaged and most
dependent on agriculture. Approximately three hundred UXO accidents
occur every year in Laos and survivors often have extensive disabling
injuries that affect them for the remainder of their lives. In addition to
physical injuries UXO survivors often experience ongoing psychological
effects and significant socio-economic losses. Treatment for UXO
injuries is often expensive and many individuals are unable to return to
traditional forms of income generation following a UXO accident. At the
national level, UXO casualties place a substantial burden on Laos’ underfunded, understaffed, and undersupplied health care system, impede the
expansion and use of agricultural land, restrict the construction of
schools, hospitals, roads, housing, and destroy the social and human
capital of the Lao workforce. These socio-economic effects of UXO will
be discussed further in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
- The Socio-economic Effects of Unexploded Ordnance -

This was the poorest ban [village] I stayed in- UXO poor.
Cultivatable land was nearby; I had been overlooking it, far
below on the banks of the Nam Ghouan, as I sat by the
roadside. But everyone feared its contents.
(Murphy 1999)

6.1 Introduction
Aside from the humanitarian effects of UXO contamination, UXO is one
of the primary factors limiting social and economic development in Laos.
A strong correlation exists between the prevalence of poverty and UXO
contamination (see figure 6.1) and according to Cave et al. (2006: 35) in
all UNDP development assistance frameworks and humanitarian
development frameworks for Laos UXO contamination is considered an
ongoing development concern. Likewise, the GoL’s own NSEDP for
2006-2010 recognises UXO as a significant inhibitor to development that
affects, in particular, already poor and vulnerable groups. While Laos'
population is slowly becoming more urbanised, population growth
continues to create the need for more safe land. Approximately eighty
percent of the Lao population are subsistence farmers (Capati 1997) and
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the inhibitory effect of UXO on land access is a significant livelihood
constraint for many people. In contrast to the negative socio-economic
effects of UXO, through the sale and reuse of its metal and explosive
contents UXO has also become an economic resource. Perhaps the most
well established informal economy in Laos, the scrap metal trade
provides a means for the rural poor to transform UXO from a livelihood
restraint into an economic opportunity. Acknowledging this duality, this
chapter

explores

both

the

socio-economic

restraints

of

UXO

contamination and its potential benefits.

6.2

The

Socio-economic

constraints

of

Unexploded

Ordnance
Within Laos’ forty-seven poorest districts the amount of contaminated
land with potential agriculture use is some 200,000 hectares. At current
clearance rates it has been estimated that this land will take
approximately fifty years to clear and will not be inexpensive (Griffin et
al. 2008: 11). Yet despite the high costs of clearance, a 2008 study by
Griffin et al. found that, at current expenditures, even from a strictly
economic standpoint the clearance of UXO is cost-effective. Access to
shops, schools, and healthcare facilities as well as the disruption of
markets, tourism, mining, hydroelectric power, forestry and other
potential investments, are all affected by UXO contamination. Livestock
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are at risk of UXO accidents, and even access to water and fuel is
impaired by UXO contamination (Kett & Mannion 2004; World Bank
2009). As can be seen in the following comments by COPE employee
Ms. Jo Pereira and Nakai residents Mr Saengchan and Mr. Simsomsouk,
the widespread effects of UXO commonly mentioned within professional
literature were supported in this research by both UXO sector operators
and those living in contaminated landscapes:

I think that the problem with the UXO issue is that it
permeates pretty much every level in society… UXO affects
poverty, it affects disability, it affects infrastructure, it pretty
much just affects everything that people are trying to do here.
(18 June 2009)

It [farming] is also very hard because of the bombs. There are
lots of bombs here and people are scared of the bombs. When
we plant rice we must be careful and we cannot grow enough
food.
(Mr. Saengchan 25 June 2006)

UXO is the biggest problem. We do have other problems but
UXO is the biggest.
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(Mr. Sisomsouk 26 June 2009)

That said, although Ms. Pereira considers UXO to be a wide-ranging
problem for development in Laos, many UXO sector operators
interviewed for this study also stated that UXO was not the biggest
development problem to affect Laos. As COPE Co-Founder Mr. Mike
Boddington States,

There are three major development issues in Laos. One
education. Any community must educate its people and this
is a huge problem in Laos particularly because of the Lao
script and the very limited availability of books… The second
biggest issue is health and the third biggest issue is the
environment. And the environment in Laos is in a terrible
state at the moment.
(07 June 2009).

This was in contrast to the responses from the majority of participants
from Nakai, who, as Mr Sisomsouk highlights, considered UXO to be the
biggest problem that they faced.
In addition to restricting land access, UXO has resulted in the over-use of
non-contaminated

land

and

reduced

agricultural

yields

from

environmental degradation (UNIDIR 2008). Such restrictions on
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development because of UXO have been labelled by the World Bank
(2008) as ‘negative investment’ because of the many ways they detract
from Laos’ development by adding to the expenditures and timeframes
needed for development initiatives. Similarly to casualty databases,
however, although obviously extensive, the exact overall socio-economic
impact of UXO contamination has been poorly quantified in Laos (World
Bank 2008). A recent estimate of the excessive cost to civilian
infrastructure resulting from UXO contamination made by the GoL’s
ministry of transport was as much as 5,000 USD per hectare (World
Bank 2008). For the Lang Xang Minerals company, UXO clearance has
for more than a decade cost up to 3,000,000 USD per year (UNDP 2008),
while the Nam Theun II hydro-electric dam spent over $US16.7 million
on UXO related activities from February 2003 to October 2007
(Landmine Monitor 2008).

6.3 Treatment of Unexploded Ordnance Casualties
Aside from the limitations to employment and development initiatives
that UXO survivors and UXO contaminated communities often
experience, the costs of medical treatment or funeral ceremonies for
UXO casualties can also send a poor family further into poverty and
destitution (Cave et al. 2006). As Mr. Tim Horner explains:
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You do have to pay for whatever treatment you require and
the people hit hardest by UXO are often the poorest. Having
to pay for treatment basically takes people from just being
able to cope to being poverty stricken.
(02 June 2009)

One of the most common methods used by rural villagers to pay for
medical treatment is the selling of livestock yet this practice also often
leads to labour shortages and the removal of family assets that may have
been used to cope with future financial hardship (HIB 2004). According
to the GoL’s National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006) the
average cost of treatment for UXO injuries can be as much as half the
annual income of a rural family and it is in this sense that UXO
contamination has been labelled by HIB (2004: 26) as a ‘poverty
multiplier’ that further impoverishes already poor families and
communities. On a broader scale, treatment and care of UXO survivors
can be a burden for whole communities and a significant additional
expenditure for Laos’ overtaxed medical system (UNDP 2008). Beyond
the immediate socio-economic constraints of UXO contamination is a
widespread (UXO inclusive) scrap metal trade that is both a form of
income generation for impoverished rural Laotians and one of the
primary causes for increasing UXO casualty rates. The most underresearched socio-economic effect of UXO contamination, this informal
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economy and how it may be more adequately addressed will constitute
the remainder of this thesis.

Figure 6.1: Map of UXO Contamination alongside Map of the Spread of Poverty in Laos

(Courtesy of PCL Bombing Data; Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research
((NCCR)) 2008)
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6.4 The Informal Economy and Unexploded Ordnance:
The Scrap Metal Trade

The New Cash Crop is Scrap Metal.
- EOD Technician (Bomb Harvest 2007)

6.4.1 Introduction
The collection of war scrap as an economic and everyday resource to be
recycled into items such as cooking utensils, flower pots, buckets, boats,
prosthetic limbs, and building supplies is widespread throughout Laos.
Since the completion of the war, and especially since 2004, the collection
and sale of scrap metal has developed into one of the most extensive
economic structures in Laos. As development, trade, and the availability
of consumer goods increases, former subsistence economies are
becoming increasingly cash driven and in many areas the sale of scrap
metal provides one of the only means for the impoverished to participate
in a monetary economy (UNDP 2008). Furthermore, regional and global
increases in the demand for steel alongside an increased availability of
cheap metal detectors and expanding road networks are all increasing the
prevalence of the scrap metal trade. In the past five years scrap metal
collectors, scrap metal dealers and scrap metal foundries have all
increased (MAG 2008b).
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While contributing substantially to rural livelihoods, the scrap metal
trade is also the most common way in which people voluntarily expose
themselves to risks with UXO and is likely to be the primary reason why
UXO casualty rates in Laos are increasing. As UNDP Senior Technical
Advisor to UXO Lao, Mr. John Dingley, states:

The scrap metal trade is a major problem for the creation of
casualties, but it is also a big enabler of cash into rural
households.
(19 June 2009)

Yet current responses to the trade have focused only on the negative
components of this potentially high risk activity. Legislation outlawing
participation in the industry and risk education programs with a ‘don’t
touch’ message have been the most commonly applied practice and have
had little success in reducing either casualties or people’s involvement
with war scrap. What is needed instead is a threefold approach
combining improved risk education strategies with increased support and
training for those involved in this risky trade alongside the provision of
alternative forms of income.
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6.4.2 Participants, Purposes, and Practice
The scrap metal trade is primarily a dry season activity that is used as a
secondary economic endeavour to supplement wet season agriculture
(Moyes 2005). In the majority of instances the scrap metal trade operates
through a simple three stage system (See figure 6.2); scrap metal
collectors search for scrap and sell their findings to local dealers, who
then in turn sell to scrap metal foundries where metal is melted down and
converted into ‘rebar’ for construction (MAG 2008b). People engage in
the scrap metal trade for a variety of reasons, perhaps even including
boredom and a desire for excitement, however, the most common and
influential reason is want or need of money (Vosburgh 2006). Indeed, the
sale of scrap metal is an activity that connects some of Laos’ poorest
people to international trade markets (Moyes 2005).
A trade with diverse levels of involvement, some people leave other
forms of employment to search for scrap metal while for others
participation merely involves selling items found while farming (Robson
2008). Some people may stay away from their homes for several days to
search for scrap while other may join scrap metal collection labour
gangs26 (Moyes 2005). Broadly speaking, distinctions may be made
between those who search for scrap and those that merely discover it by
26

Scrap metal labour gangs is the name given to people who accompany a scrap metal dealer to
an area where it is believed there is a lot of scrap metal. These individuals are given the day to
search for scrap and then sell their findings in the evening.
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chance, as well as between those who avoid UXO when discovered and
those who will actively engage with or try to dismantle UXO (GICHD
2007). In the case of the latter, many scrap metal dealers and scrap metal
foundries will not take items that they identify as UXO and, not wanting
to lose the value of the metal, some scrap collectors will attempt to
dismantle UXO. Essentially, this means that the poorest individuals in
the scrap metal trade face the greatest levels of risk (UNDP 2008).
In the context of poverty and geographical isolation, scrap metal
collection is often regarded as a safe activity in the sense that it generates
an extra income to complement subsistence farming (GICHD 2007).
Intentional risk taking by those engaged in the scrap metal trade is
generally based within a rational decision making process that evaluates
the costs and benefits of pursuing other options (Durham 2007). Indeed
previous studies (Durham 2007) have shown that where other options
have more perceived advantages than the collection of scrap, people will
generally abandon the scrap metal trade. Such viable alternatives have,
however, proven extremely difficult to create. Even when other sources
of income are available the sheer amount of scrap metal to be found
means that the trade generally provides the most substantial returns on
time and labour invested (Moyes 2005). Inputs required for the business
are minimal, with a low initial investment needed and high returns on
labour invested and quick returns on investment are common.
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Furthermore, scrap metal collection is one of the few activities where
buyers will come into the village to collect the product and where other
forms of loans are nonexistent some scrap metal dealers have even been
willing to provide metal detectors in lieu of payment (Moyes 2005;
GICHD 2007). Finally, the collection of scrap metal can be used not only
as an immediate form of income, rather if stored, it can become a form of
financial investment for families without means of saving.
When labelling the scrap metal trade as a high risk activity it must be
remembered that in heavily UXO contaminated areas it is likely that the
limited available farmland may also be contaminated and so even the
growing of food is a potentially risky activity. Indeed in a 2007 study by
GICHD, rural Laotian villagers claimed that they could find up to thirty
kilograms of scrap metal per year just by conducting their regular
farming activities. In times of food shortage, illness, or other livelihood
shocks, any additional income is beneficial in strengthening the family
survival buffer and scrap metal collection is therefore often perceived as
an activity like any other (GICHD 2007). That said, although scrap metal
collection may be more prevalent amongst societies poorest, it is not
solely an activity used for subsistence. In many areas the sale of war
scrap is increasingly being used as a means to generate income for an
expanding market of consumer goods (Moyes 2005: 17) or for social
events such as weddings or other parties. In other words, the financial
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contributions of the scrap metal trade into the local or household
economy differs between districts and provinces (GICHD 2007). For the
future of the scrap metal trade, that scrap metal is a finite resource may
also lead to an increase in scrap metal collection as people are aware they
must exploit this resource while it is still available. Likewise, as safe
scrap becomes harder to find people are also likely to take greater risks
with UXO (Moyes 2005). In such circumstances, creating an adequate
nationwide response to the reduction of casualties resulting from the
scrap metal trade will be no simple task.

Figure 6.2 Diagram of Common Interchanges in the Scrap Metal Trade
(GICHD 2007)
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6.4.3 Existing Responses to the Scrap Metal Trade:
6.4.3.1 Legislation
Due to the high UXO casualty rates that the scrap metal trade produces
the core national response has focused on outlawing scrap metal
collection. In many provinces in Laos there are already decrees against
scrap metal collection and the GoL’s currently strategy is to expand these
decrees to a nationwide legislation against the scrap metal trade (GICHD
2007). However, considering how crucial the income generated from
scrap metal is for many rural families such legislation is inappropriate
and seemingly ineffective. To date, already existing provincial decrees
appear to have had little to no effect on reducing the trade and this was
supported by many participants from group one who stated that
legislation would do nothing. In many cases people are unaware of the
laws against collecting scrap metal and when people are aware,
enforcement of such laws is highly difficult. In Khammouane and
Savannakhet provinces, for example, metal detectors are technically
illegal yet they are still openly for sale in many local markets and used
daily by people who are searching for scrap metal or checking that their
land is safe for farming (Moyes 2005: 18). Such laws conflict with local
knowledge that some items of scrap metal are not dangerous (Moyes
2005), and if police were to become more vigilant the trade would
become more secretive, more difficult to address, and therefore less safe.
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Furthermore, a 2004 study by HIB has indicated that illegalising the trade
may have a detrimental effect on the lives of UXO accident victims if
they become seen by fellow villagers as criminals.
More pertinent than these issues is that such laws essentially seek to
punish the impoverished for attempting to compensate for the many
negative effects of UXO contamination. Aware of this fact, some district
administrators have complained that they are being asked to encroach
upon people’s livelihoods without providing them with any viable
alternatives (Moyes 2005). Indeed, successful illegalisation of the trade
would mean the destruction of an extensive economic industry and
means of food security as well as an increase in the overall amount of
time before Laos will be free from UXO. As already mentioned, people
engage in the scrap metal trade primarily because it is one of few
opportunities available for them to generate a cash income. Instead of
outlawing these activities, the GoL and other UXO operators may
achieve greater successes in making the trade less dangerous by working
with scrap metal collectors, dealers, and foundries. As Griffin et al
(2008) has rightfully argued, the only legislation against the scrap metal
trade worthy of implementation is an illegalisation of the involvement of
children in the industry.
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6.4.3.2 Inappropriate Risk Education
When people engage with UXO it is generally out of necessity rather
than a lack of knowledge. As a result, general ‘don’t touch’ risk
education messages on the dangers of UXO are inappropriate and thus
ineffective (Wells Dang 2006). In a 2005 study by GICHD on risk
education in Laos, little evidence was found to show that existing
programs had resulted in a reduction of casualty rates (Griffin et al. 2008:
30). Likewise, in 2006 MAG conducted an assessment that found that
despite a high overall awareness of the dangers and risks of UXO
amongst both adults (82%) and children (99.6%) people continued to live
or interact with potentially dangerous UXO on a daily basis (Durham
2007). An issue not limited to Laos, similar findings have been
discovered by researchers in other heavily contaminated states such as
Lebanon and Cambodia, where up to ninety-seven percent of UXO
casualties had participated in risk education activities (UNIDIR 2008;
Vosburgh 2006). These findings do not mean that risk education should
be abandoned; rather they simply demonstrate that previous risk
education strategies have been poorly targeted.
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6.4.4 Recommendations for Future Responses:
6.4.4.1 Increased Support for Scrap Metal Activities
Rather than trying to eliminate the scrap metal trade the GoL and NGO’s
should consider providing education and support networks to reduce the
risk of scrap metal related activities. New policies would benefit from
including the provision of safety and UXO identification training to scrap
metal collectors, dealers, and foundry employees and more efficient
response times by roving teams to reports of UXO (Vosburgh 2006). To
facilitate these changes the amount of roving27 teams will need to be
increased and should establish strong communication networks between
themselves, scrap metal collectors, dealers, and foundries (Griffin et al.
2008). Individuals who report UXO to clearance or roving teams should
either be provided with the scrap metal from the munition once it has
been rendered safe or paid the equivalent cash value when this is not
possible. In a 2008 report on the UXO sector Griffin et al. suggested
lotteries as a possible way of providing UXO clearance to families
personal agricultural land. A similar system would be useful for
providing small cash rewards to those who have reported UXO to
clearance or roving teams. To make UXO accidents less fatal, village
medics from highly contaminated areas could be trained to deal with
UXO accidents, and all foundries could be made to have at least one
27

Roving teams are UXO clearance teams that respond to reports of UXO.
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employee with basic medical training. Furthermore, as Moyes (2005: 44)
has argued, scrap metal foundries should be required to open their
premises for inspection, store suspicious items separately to other scrap,
and provide their employees with basic training in UXO recognition. Any
scrap metal dealers or foundries to be discovered purchasing scrap from
children should be held legally accountable. If the scrap metal trade were
approached in this manner it would at the very least remove the need for
people to try and dismantle UXO. Thankfully, some organisations in
Laos are already adopting a more pragmatic approach that is in
accordance with the aforementioned recommendations.
In 2008 MAG cleared 85,000 items of UXO from a scrap metal foundry
in Xiengkhouan province28 and provided over one hundred risk education
sessions to nearby scrap metal dealers and the foundry employees. In
addition MAG set up communication networks so scrap metal dealers
and the scrap metal foundry could more easily report items of UXO. In
regards to scrap metal collectors, MAG is already implementing a
program where they return the scrap metal from disarmed UXO to those
who discover and report items that are suspected to be dangerous.
Additionally, FSD is indirectly making the scrap metal trade safer
through its training program for village health volunteers, while HIB

28

Xiengkhouan province has one of the most prolific scrap metal industries in Laos
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recently began a home gardening program intended to provide an
alternative form of income to scrap metal collectors (Sisawath 2008).

6.4.4.2 Reappropriating Risk Education
Conscious of the limitations of existing risk education programs in Laos,
operators are beginning to alter their risk education strategies to focus
more on behavioural change amongst high risk groups. According to Mr.
Gregory Cathcart, for example, MAG are looking at scaling down their
risk education activities and focusing only on high risk groups such as
those involved in the scrap metal trade (09 June 2009). Likewise, HIB
have also begun to target at risk groups and are using village volunteers
within these communities. Furthermore, with funding from UNICEF,
HIB recently developed a new risk education module titled ‘how to
protect your children from Unexploded Ordnance- A guide for parents’.
This module is in accordance with recent changes in risk education
policy towards a behavioural change communication approach.
WEC and the Ministry of Education have been working together to
implement risk education programs into the national primary school
system and hopefully this program will increase the nationalisation and
sustainability of risk education procedures (UNDP 2008). UXO Lao is in
the process of changing the focus of its risk education programs to target
at risk groups such as scrap metal collectors, parents of children who
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collect scrap, and villages with high casualty rates (UXO Lao 09). Of risk
education practices already in use, community liaison will remain an
important part of the sector as without it there would be no local
information on contamination or priority areas for organisations to
conduct clearance (MAG 2008). Instead of trying to completely eliminate
risky behaviour, risk education strategies would achieve greater
successes if they sought to make this largely unavoidable activity safer
(Vosburgh 2006). Likewise, new approaches should seek to ameliorate
the disparity between UXO operators and rural Laotians opinions on the
dangers of UXO (Durham 2007) and are fortunately slowly beginning to
be implemented in Laos.

6.4.4.3 Providing Alternative Incomes
While providing better risk education and greater training and support
will make the scrap metal trade immediately safer, these programs will
not provide an opportunity for individuals to altogether cease their
involvement in the industry. To achieve this end, what is needed is a
viable and competitive economic alternative. Poor harvests and food
shortages coupled with no economic opportunities and widespread
contamination are the primary factors informing people’s decisions to
take risks with UXO and when livelihoods improve people’s willingness
to take risks generally decreases (CMVIS, 2006) In a 2006 study by the
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Cambodia Mine Victims Information Service (CMVIS) on why UXO
casualty rates were decreasing in a Cambodian village, improved
economic factors were found to be the principal reason why casualties,
and scrap metal collection, had decreased. While this may seem an
obvious conclusion, through illegalisation and a ‘don’t touch’ risk
education strategy, the response to the scrap metal trade in Laos has
focused more on the prevention of engagement with scrap metal rather
than the provision of alternatives.
Due to variations in climate, ethnicity, and socio-economic status,
alternative income programs will need to differ between the highlands,
midlands, and lowlands of Laos. Within these regions alternatives would
benefit from a variety of activities so that the failure of one project does
not necessitate the collapse of the whole program. Small pilot programs
such as HIB’s home garden program29 are in accordance with this idea
and should be developed by other NGO’s alongside risk education and
other previously mentioned support systems. Although no ‘magic bullet’,
an increase in the relationship between the UXO sector and tourism may
be one way to provide financial opportunities, particularly in the southern
provinces of Khammouane and Savannakhet.

29

A recent initiative by HIB has been to provide training and support to develop a home
gardening program in villages with high levels of involvement in the scrap metal trade. The aim
of this program is to create a safe, income generating alternative to scrap metal collection (Kim
Warren 14 June 2009).
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6.4.4.3.1 Post-conflict Tourism
Over the past decade tourism has become a major source of revenue for
Laos’ economy. According to a 2006 Lao PDR Human Development
Report, tourism is the country’s largest service export and in 2004
accounted for approximately 119,000,000 USD. One of the governments
eleven priority sectors for socio-economic development, the potential
financial, social, environmental and cultural benefits of tourism have
been embraced by the Lao government (Askew et al. 2007). Although not
all tourism in Laos may be beneficial to human development, the existing
UNESCO/ Lao National Tourism Association eco-tourism project at
Luang Namtha has been recognised internationally and won several
awards for its success. Of equal importance to international praise, local
people have reported high levels of satisfaction with the project and have
been able to gain employment and other forms of economic benefits
without having to migrate from their remote communities (Schipani
2008). As the tourist industry continues to expand in Laos there is
potential for the UXO sector to use previous projects such as Luang
Namtha as a base framework to increase the linkages between UXO
activities and tourism. Although tourism does have the potential to
worsen human development, it is not in the scope of this thesis to provide
an analysis of tourism’s possible flaws. Instead this thesis will simply
provide a proposal for the creation of a tourist program that, if
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implemented correctly, may be one of the few industries with the
potential to provide an adequate alternative to the scrap metal trade.
Many UXO operators in Laos already have some involvement with the
tourism sector. UXO Lao has a museum about UXO in Luang Prabang,
MAG have a visitors centre in both Phonsavan and Vientiane, and COPE
also has a visitors centre. In addition to these centres tour operator
Intrepid Travel provide funding to UXO Lao and various other tour
operators such as Carpe Diem have been supportive of COPE’s services.
An important component of UXO activities, tourism raises awareness
about the problem of UXO contamination and provides a valuable form
of revenue for UXO operators. There remains much potential, however,
to further the relationship between UXO activities and tourism and, in
particular, to expand the benefits of the tourist industry beyond UXO
operators and into UXO affected communities. As it is currently
operating the UXO sector is largely focused on providing the opportunity
for development to occur as opposed to creating development. As MAG
Lao’s Program Officer, Mr. Gregory Cathcart, states,

Clearance doesn't do much by itself and we have to ensure
that once clearance has taken place development is
undertaken.
(09 June 2009).
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Yet if the bonds between clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and
tourism could be improved these activities could provide income
generation, skills training, and new opportunities for UXO affected
communities. Put simply, through tourism there is the potential for UXO
activities to shift from a development pre-requisite to a development
provider.

6.4.4.3.2 Tourism and the Scrap Metal Trade
With the success of the Luang Namtha eco-tourism project and the
already existing relationships between risk education teams and local
communities much of the ground work is already in place to develop ecotourism amongst UXO affected communities. RE staff are already in
contact with local people and know their livelihood systems, cultural
practices and development priorities and these relationships could be
used to discuss and develop eco-tourism projects. Combining tourism
skills training with RE should make more people interested in
participating in RE activities and make RE programs more cost effective.
Existing RE village volunteers could use their knowledge of UXO to
become guides for UXO related tourism; transforming RE activities into
employment training as well as a risk reduction strategy. First aid
training for tour guides would provide the skills for local people to assist
UXO casualties and, perhaps most importantly of all, tourism is an
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industry that is more popular in the dry season when scrap metal
collection increases. Although not a nationwide solution, there are
regions where substantial opportunities for the expansion of eco-tourism
exist.
In Savannakhet and Khammouane province, the expansion of ecotourism would provide a mid-point destination for tourists between the
already popular destinations of Vientiane and Laos’ southern ‘four
thousand islands’ region. Described by the 2008 Lonely Planet as
containing ‘often spectacular mountains’, Khammouane province is
home to people from the Hmong, Tais, Makong, Kri, Katang, Maling,
Atel, Phuan, and Themarou ethnicity groups. Likewise there are many
ethnic minority groups in Savannakhet province and HIB already has
existing interaction with some of these communities. Furthermore, an
already existing border crossing between Laos and Vietnam in
Savannakhet province has made Savannakhet town a popular tourist
destination for Vietnamese tourists to Laos and a large number of hotels
and guest houses are already operating in this area.

6.5 Conclusion
UXO is a widespread inhibitor of socio-economic development and all
NGO’s working in contaminated areas must be aware of what effect
UXO is going to have on their specific objectives. Yet just as UXO
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contamination restricts socio-economic growth, the resourcefulness of
rural Laotians has in many areas resulted in the transformation of this
economic burden into an economic asset. An extensive and well
organised industry, the scrap metal trade is one of the only means of cash
income for many of Laos’ rural poor. Both a generator and an inhibitor of
economic wealth, due to extensive UXO contamination the scrap metal
trade is largely responsible for recent increases in UXO casualty rates
throughout Laos. As development increases in Laos so too will the
demand for steel, the availability and desire for consumer goods and, it
can be assumed, the scrap metal trade. Yet due to misunderstandings of
local perceptions and practices current responses to the scrap metal trade
have been largely unsuccessful. Unless alternative forms of income are
provided people’s involvement in the scrap metal trade is unlikely to
experience any significant reduction. However, creating alternative
incomes that are competitive with the level of income generation
provided by the scrap metal trade is a difficult task that will require input
from development organisations not directly involved in the UXO sector.
Until this can be achieved the UXO sector should consider shifting its
response from condemnation of the trade to providing support for those
involved in this high risk economic market. Risk education programs
would achieve greater success if they sought not to prevent people from
engaging with UXO, rather they should attempt to explain how this

109

inevitably risky activity can be made safer. Greater interaction between
UXO operators and scrap metal collectors, dealers, and foundries would
be beneficial and roving teams should be increased so that reported UXO
responses are immediate. Except in regards to children, laws against the
scrap metal trade must be removed. Although undoubtedly a high risk
activity, if handled correctly the scrap metal trade does provide an
economic opportunity for Laos’ rural poor.
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7. Conclusion: Unexploded Ordnance as an Inhibitor of
Laos’ Development
Now over thirty-four years since the Second Indochina War, unexploded
ordnance (UXO) remaining from this conflict persists as one of the most
widespread restraints to human development in Laos. While there is an
increasingly well functioning UXO sector in Laos, outside of this small
collection of civil society organisations insufficient recognition has been
given to the effects of UXO contamination. As in most post-conflict
UXO contaminated states, Laos’ UXO sectoral response has been created
in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards guidelines
and, as has been shown in this thesis, having a basis in such an
internationally accepted framework means that Laos’ UXO sector can be
rigorously assessed. However, even in the three UNDP’s Human
Development Reports on Laos by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), UXO contamination is barely mentioned (UNDP
1998; UNDP 2001: UNDP 2006). Although the UNDP and various
multi-lateral and bilateral donors do offer funding and support to the
UXO sector in Laos, they do so almost as if UXO contamination is a
singular problem that has no influence on other fields of development.
Furthermore, despite being the worlds most UXO contaminated country
(Cave et al. 2006), non-UXO related development agencies in Laos
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continue to overlook what effect UXO will have on their prospective
projects.
Within the UXO sector discrepancies exist between how UXO response
operators perceive the problem of UXO contamination and how people
living in contaminated areas perceive this problem. According to many
UXO operators UXO contamination is not the biggest development
problem that Laos experiences as problems such as food security and
education are considered to be more important. However, as was shown
in Chapter Six, UXO contamination affects both food security and
education and all participants from Nakai district that were interviewed
for this research reported UXO as the biggest livelihood problem they
faced. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that UXO operators are
more concerned with normalised structural foundations of development
while Laotians from Nakai were more concerned with their everyday
lived experience. Fear of UXO contamination, for example, was one of
the most repeated problems described by those participants who lived
daily on Nakai’s UXO contaminated landscape. Yet fear is a difficult
factor for development organisations to measure and the effects of fear
from UXO on Laos’ human development have been largely overlooked
in the UXO sectors response to UXO contamination. No psycho-social
response specifically targeting the effects of UXO exists in Laos, either
from the government or from other civil society organisations. While
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clearance is undoubtedly an important part of the response to UXO
contamination, more support needs to be given to the physical, social and
psychological needs of UXO contaminated communities. As in most
UXO contaminated countries, high risk groups for UXO casualties in
Laos were found to be adult males and children of both sexes and the
support of UXO casualties is important to socio-economic development,
individual comfort, and the reduction of fear in UXO affected
communities. Put simply, greater support is needed for the effects of
UXO on the body.
Although the negative socio-economic effects of UXO are well known
by the professionals working in Laos’ UXO sector, greater research is
needed into the economies of the scrap metal trade. Due to high levels of
casualty rates resulting from scrap metal collection (that often includes
tampering with UXO) previous risk education responses to the UXO
sector have focused on ‘educating’ people of the dangers of UXO and
why they should not engage with dangerous items. These risk education
programs have been supported by government attempts to outlaw scrap
metal collection. However, as has been shown in this thesis, the scrap
metal trade is both a cause of casualties and a means of income for Laos’
rural poor and outlawing the trade or warning people of its potential
danger will have little success in reducing casualty rates. Instead, what is
needed is a risk education program focused on behavioural change,
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greater interaction with and support for scrap metal collectors and
dealers, and the provision of alternative incomes to provide people with
the cash that they are currently acquiring from the sale of scrap metal. As
development and economic growth increases in Laos, so too will
people’s desire for consumer goods and, as a result, those who are not
benefiting from growth are likely to become more involved in the scrap
metal trade. With an estimated fifty more years before UXO is cleared
from useable land, people’s engagement in the scrap metal trade is not
likely to cease anytime soon and reducing the risk of scrap metal
activities should be a priority of the Laos’ UXO sector. Indeed it is
probable that the relationship between development and increased
involvement in scrap metal economies is common to many long-term
UXO affected countries, although further research is required to confirm
this.
In regards to the field of development theory, Laos’ UXO contamination
and the need for greater understanding of the effects of UXO on
development draw attention to the deficiencies of post-conflict theory
and human development theory in examining the legacy of conflict in the
consolidation stages of post-conflict development. UXO contamination
affects over eighty-two (Borrie 2003) countries worldwide and its
presence should be of greater concern to the international development
community. Much international outcry has rightfully existed about the
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use of anti-personnel mines in warfare (APM’s) but as has been shown
throughout this thesis UXO contamination often has a more substantial
effect on post-conflict communities than APM’s and requires an equal
amount of attention. Future research into the effects of UXO
contamination must seek to strengthen the relationship between postconflict and human development understandings of development. In
Laos, more research is required into the effects of fear from UXO on
human development and how casualty rates resulting from the scrap
metal trade can be more adequately reduced. This thesis has suggested
eco-tourism as one possible economic alternative to scrap metal
collection

and

more

research

considering

the

feasibility

and

implementation of this proposal should be undertaken. The provision of
alternative incomes to the scrap metal trade is an activity that will require
expertise from outside of Laos’ UXO sector and again brings forth the
need for greater integration of the issue of UXO contamination into other
fields of development. Unless the response to unexploded ordnance
becomes a central component of wider development practice in postconflict countries, true consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction will
remain unattainable.
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Annex 1
Semi-Structured Interview Questions
Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Sample Group 1

1. Is there a certain area/s in Laos where you/your organization
work most frequently?
2. What primarily does your work involve?
3. Since you have been in Laos what changes have you seen or
made in this area?
4. Have you noticed any particular challenges to rural communities?
If so, what are they?
5. Do you think that rural Laotians access to safe, farmable, land has
been consistently improving for the period that you have been
working? What factors are restricting Laotian land usage?
6. Do you think enough work is being done towards improving land
access? Are there any structural or bureaucratic restraints in
regard to providing Laotians with safe land or with any other key
socio-economic issues you may have identified while operating in
Laos?
7. Are there any areas related to your field of socio-economic
development that you think are being neglected or may require
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greater

attention?

What

should

new

developmental

workers/organizations in Laos focus on?
8. How important do you think education programs about the
dangers of UXO are?
9. What about the local people, have they developed their own ways
to seek access to safe land or found other means of subsistence
when safe land is not available? How do you think they have
adapted to the socio-economic problems they face in post-conflict
Laos?
10. I understand there is an emerging scrap metal trade in Laos? How
significant a problem do you think this is?
11. Do you think outlawing the trade or the use of metal detectors is
likely to have a strong reductive effect on scrap metal collection?
12. Do you know of any alternative means of income that may be
viable to replace the scrap metal industry?
13. How significant a problem do you think UXO is for Laos and its
socio-economic development?
14. Do you think there are other developmental issues that are equally
or more significant than the issues that you and your organization
are focused on?
15. How has the government responded to the socio-economic
development of rural land access and other key challenges
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regarding post-war capacity building? What capacities is it still
lacking in?
16. What sort of support systems are in place by the government for
people who have injuries or a loss of income as a result of injuries
from UXO?
17. Does tourism fit into your program in any way? Are tourists
showing an interest in the work that you/your organisation do?
18. Do you think an increased international awareness of the problem
of UXO contamination in Laos

would help to improve the

international developmental support that Laos receives?
19. What about non-formal work related to land access or food
provision? Are there any tour operators, restaurant owners, or
other businesses, that have been supportive of post-conflict issues
of development?
20. What would you consider the most significant socio-economic
problem for the future work of development organizations in
Laos?
21. Is there anything else that you would like to add?
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Sample Group 2
1. What province in Laos are you from? What is the land like in the
area where you live? Is it heavily forested? Is it mountainous or
flat?
2. How do people in your village earn an income? How do they
support their families?
3. How is land used where you live? Do most people only grow
enough food to live on or is there a surplus of food that they can
sell?
4. What are some of the biggest problems people from your village
face in their everyday lives?
5. Is access to farmable/useable land an issue?
6. Obviously the legacy of the American-Vietnam war still
continues to impact on many peoples lives in Laos. Do you feel
that your livelihood, or the livelihood of others in your village, is
still being affected by the war?
7. In what ways have people adapted to these issues that you have
mentioned or incorporated them into their lives?
8. I understand that people in Laos still continue to suffer injuries
from unexploded ordnance that remains from the AmericaVietnam conflict. During the past year have people from your
village suffered any injuries that were a result of remnants of the
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war such as scrap metal? Can you explain how these accidents
affect these peoples livelihoods or their ability to participate in
village activities?
9. Are these accidents/injuries common and are they more likely to
happen to certain people because of the work they do? Are
children and adults affected equally?
10. I understand that in Laos people still sell or collect scrap metal
that is left over from the war. Do people from you village do this?
11. How do people get access to scrap metal? How do they know
where to look for it and how do they find it?
12. Why do you think they do this? how do they usually spend the
money they get from selling scrap metal?
13. Is there a difference between safe and unsafe scrap metal? How
do people tell the difference? What do people from your village
normally do if they find unsafe scrap metal?
14. Do you think an increase in tourism to where you live would
benefit the local people?
15. Have any organizations come to your village to help with the war
legacy issues that we have talked about or with any other
development issues? What work did they do? Was there anything
else you would have liked them to have done?
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16. Would you say that the problem of UXO is one of the biggest
inhibitors to socio-economic development that you face in your
everyday life?
17. What others problems do you face that are equally or more
important than the issues we have spoken about?
18. Is there anything else you would like to add?

